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ABSTRACT 
 
NACONA J. NIX: Nietzsche’s Historiography: History and Culture in the Second Untimely 
Meditation 
(Under the direction of Michael Lienesch) 
 
 
 This thesis analyzes Friedrich Nietzsche’s response to the growing 
professionalization of history in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.  I begin by exploring 
traditional historians’ attempts to answer the question of why we read and write about the 
past.  In doing so, I highlight postmodernist objections to positivistic history and enumerate 
the various social and political uses to which contemporary histories are put.  I then turn to 
the second Untimely Meditation to evaluate Nietzsche’s claim that the products of the 
scientific pursuit of history overwhelm weak minds and prevent future generations from 
undertaking projects of cultural reform and renewal.   I argue that while Nietzsche’s 
description of the deleterious effects of German historicism contains much that is 
recognizable in twenty-first century liberal democracies, his historiography condones a 
cavalier attitude toward historical truth that privileges mythmaking and culture above science 
and politics.  I conclude by suggesting how modern academic history could better serve the 
needs of a democratic citizenry.   
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CHAPTER 1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
History, we can confidently assert, is useful in the sense that art and music, 
poetry and flowers, religion and philosophy are useful. Without it—as with 
these—life would be poorer and meaner; without it we should be denied some 
of those intellectual and moral experiences which give meaning and richness 
to life. Surely it is no accident that the study of history has been the solace of 
many of the noblest minds of every generation. 
        Henry Steele Commager 
 
History, n: an account mostly false, of events mostly unimportant, which are 
brought about by rulers, knaves, and soldiers, mostly fools. 
         Ambrose Bierce 
 
 
Attempting to answer the question of why we do history—why we write about the 
past or study it—the Scottish born historian and essayist Thomas Carlyle remarked that 
history—as “the letter of Instructions, which the old generations write and posthumously 
transmit to the new”—“recommends itself as the most profitable of all studies.”1  But what 
do we gain by reading and writing about the past?  Ancient, medieval, and modern historians 
all trumpeted the rewards of a historical education even though the purposes of their work 
were often markedly different.  No one response is likely to satisfy everyone, but today’s 
historians generally agree on some combination of reasons why the disciplined study of the 
past forms an indispensable part of the humanities. 
                                                
1 Thomas Carlyle, “On History Again,” in English and Other Critical Essays (London: J. M. Dent & 
Sons, 1915), 91 (emphasis mine). 
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As Herodotus claimed in History of the Persian Wars, writing about the past 
preserves and celebrates the memory of great men and wonderful deeds.2  Insofar as the 
actions of the altruistic, courageous, and compassionate are juxtaposed with the exploits of 
the selfish, cowardly, and merciless, knowledge of history can reveal general truths about 
human nature and behavior and provide moral and political lessons for future generations.3  
History helps in the creation of personal and cultural identities and establishes links between 
the individual and the community; it helps create a “feeling of shared experience between 
generations, between ancestors and descendants, between the living and the dead.”4  History 
expands the range of our vision by making us privy to values, customs, and opinions of 
people of different national origins, racial groups, political allegiances, religious affiliations, 
and sexual orientations, thereby forcing us to confront our parochial partialities and 
prejudices head-on.  Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the study of history empowers us 
                                                
2 See Herodotus, The History, trans. David Grene (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987), 33: 
“Herodotus of Halicarnassus, am here setting forth my history, that time may not draw the color from 
what man has brought into being, nor those great and wonderful deeds, manifested by both Greeks 
and barbarians, fail of their report, and, together with all this, the reason why they fought one 
another.” Before Herodotus scribed his inquiries, Homer sang of the gods and the heroes of the 
Trojan War in his Iliad, committing to writing his interpretation of a tale that had served as a principal 
source of education, edification, and entertainment for centuries of Greeks.    
  
3 See Robert B. Strassler, ed., The Landmark Thucydides: A Comprehensive Guide to the 
Peloponnesian War (New York: Touchstone, 1998), 1.23, 16: “The absence of romance in my history 
will, I fear, detract somewhat from its interest; but if it be judged useful by those inquirers who desire 
an exact knowledge of the past as an aid to the understanding of the future, which is the course of 
human things must resemble if it does not reflect it, I shall be content. In fine, I have written my 
work, not as an essay which is to win the applause of the moment, but as a possession for all time.”  
See also Niccolò Machiavelli, Selected Political Writings, ed. and trans. David Wootton 
(Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 1994), 216: “Wise men often say, and not without good reason, 
that if you want to predict the future you should look at the past, for everything that happens, no 
matter where or when, has its analogue in past history.  The reason for this is that men have and 
always have had the same passions, so it inevitably follows that their passions have the same effects, 
and their deeds do not change.” 
 
4 Theodore S. Hammerow, “The Bureaucratization of History,” American Historical Review 94, no. 3 
(June 1989), 658. 
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to break and expose myths, to check empirically whether a story has its ultimate basis in fact 
or fiction—in essence, to discover truth. 
Today many postmodernists, however, object to the notion that the study of the past 
amounts to a search for truth.  They quickly point out that the products of our historical 
excavation work are always less than the past, for indeed the content of the totality of past 
events is virtually limitless.5  Making matters worse, the records of the past that we have 
been fortunate enough to recover are necessarily incomplete and often inaccurate.  No matter 
how committed to honest investigation and open processes of research historians may be, 
they inevitably introduce bias in their research because they must decide what people, places, 
events and periods will be included in the historical narrative and which will be left out.  And 
of course, no matter how great our stock of primary sources from which to construct an 
accurate portrayal of the past, there is no way to check the truth of an account by its 
correspondence with “what actually happened,” because there is no historical reality within 
reach.  Whereas the scientist judges the validity of his theory by the outcome of an 
experiment in a laboratory or the observation of a phenomenon in nature, the historian can 
make no such appeal.  Rather, he must rely on the fragmentary accounts of others, 
constructing a chronicle of the past that best makes sense of the available records and 
manages to survive the critical scrutiny of his academic peers.  Nancy F. Partner neatly 
summarizes the findings of her survey of the scholarly literature within historiography when 
she writes, 
 
 
 
                                                
5 Keith Jenkins, Re-Thinking History  (New York: Routledge, 1991), 11. 
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All historians know that history is no longer the discipline fulfilling its positivistic 
promise to tell it all as it really happened.  And, in fact, that cultural moment, of naive 
assertions about splicing together an entire, indubitable, objectivity once-existing 
Past, was a very brief digression in history’s longer, more richly compromised life as 
the expressive artifact of tradition, culture, human defiance of time-the whole cultural 
baggage carried variously and jointly by religion, literature, art, and history.6 
 
 Fully aware now of the fact that history, as Claude Lévi-Strauss put it, is never 
history simply, but history-for, contemporary historians attempt to rectify the complaint that 
the historian is not ideologically neutral by writing histories that give the historically 
underrepresented—women, minorities, and the poor in particular—their due.  Feminist 
historians, for example, attempt to re-read and re-interpret history from a female perspective, 
addressing the imbalance in history that has resulted from the near systematic exclusion of 
women from the historical, philosophical, artistic, and scientific tradition.7  Such historians 
write with a particular purpose in mind: the reappraisal of the role of women in the past and 
the mainstreaming of marginalized perspectives.  There being no neutral ideological position 
from which to do history, the answer to the problem of historical objectivity has been, 
perhaps counterintuitively, more history. 
 The conditions of postmodernism have produced a multiplicity of histories 
encountered everywhere in our democratic, consumerist culture, a mass of genres to be 
variously used and abused: professional historians’ histories, popularizations of professional 
                                                
6  Nancy F. Partner, “Making Up Lost Time: Writing on the Writing of History,” Speculum 61, no. 1 
(January 1986), 117. 
 
7 In Northanger Abbey, Catherine Morland explains something of what might be Jane Austen’s view 
of history:  “History, real solemn history, I cannot be interested in.  I read it a little as a duty; but it 
tells me nothing that does not either vex or weary me.  The quarrels of popes and kings, with wars 
and pestilence in every page; the men so good for nothing, and hardly any women at all, it is very 
tiresome.”  Consider also Philip Howard’s remark that “most history is a record of the triumphs, 
disasters, and follies of top people.  The black hole in it is in the way of life of mute, inglorious men 
and women who made no nuisance of themselves in the world.” 
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histories, children’s histories, popular-memory histories, black histories, women’s histories, 
reactionary histories, revolutionary histories, etc., all of which are affected by local, regional, 
national, and international perspectives.8  But what are the implications of this endless 
production and circulation of histories for politics?  Must we dispense with the idea that 
history contains past models that ought to be presented to young readers for emulation?  
Does the postmodern predilection for unconventional narratives and re-description 
necessarily undermine the notion that there are readily identifiable and universally salutary 
moral lessons embedded in history?  Has the explosion in historical knowledge forced 
historians to abdicate their traditional role as the bulwarks of cultural heritage?  And if so, 
what effects must this have on the physic health of individuals and communities? 
 As a professor of Greek philosophy at the University of Basel and teacher in a local 
academy for five years, Friedrich Nietzsche worried that the tendency of nineteenth century 
German historians to pursue a scientific, perspective-free version of history might render 
traditional historical education psychologically detrimental and practically impotent.  While 
anticipating the objections to history (Historie, in the sense of the academic investigation of 
the past, as opposed to Geschichte, the events of earlier times) proffered by postmoderns, 
Nietzsche routinely took it for granted that objective historical knowledge was possible.9  
However, he maintained that history practiced for lucre and profession rather than for the 
benefit and use of mankind resulted in a highly deterministic view of history that left little 
room for human agency, overwhelming weak minds with the knowledge of world-views 
different from their own and preventing future generations from pursuing projects of cultural 
                                                
8 Jenkins, Re-Thinking History, 65-66.  
 
9 Peter Berkowitz, Nietzsche: The Ethics of an Immoralist (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 
1995), 27. 
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reform and renewal.  The problem with history is not that historians cannot know about the 
past or that they have ignored multitudes worthy of mention; rather, the problem is that they 
fail to distinguish between useful and useless knowledge—knowledge that can promote, 
preserve, and moderate healthy society and knowledge that can impede and destroy it. 
In the second of his Untimely Meditations, On the Uses and Disadvantages of History 
for Life10 (Von Nutzen und Nachteil der Historie für das Leben), Nietzsche catalogues the 
“striking symptoms” of cultural decline in his age and diagnoses his own culture as suffering 
from a “consuming fever” and a “malady” caused by its obsessive “cultivation of history.”  
Although his essay consists in part of a prescription for a cure—embodied in the plea that 
historians employ the monumental, antiquarian, and critical “species of history” in the 
service of culture with the knowledge of their respective potential for abuse—it comprises 
primarily a description of the deleterious effects of an excess of the “historical sense.”  
Commentators on Nietzsche’s polemic typically forgo a detailed analysis of the multifarious 
manifestations he offers as evidence of Germany’s crisis of historicism, but these sections 
merit greater scholarly attention, for they make plain Nietzsche’s unflagging demands for 
philosophical rigor and artistic unity in the High German culture of the future.  I argue that 
while Nietzsche’s description of the deleterious effects of historicism contains much that is 
recognizable (and regrettable) in twenty-first century liberal democracies, his historiography 
condones a cavalier attitude toward historical truth that privileges mythmaking and culture 
above science and politics.  Although the history of the twentieth century makes clear the 
tragic consequences of such illiberal priorities, Nietzsche’s lamentations over the 
                                                
10 Friedrich Nietzsche, On the Uses and Disadvantages of History for Life, in Untimely Meditations, 
trans. R. J. Hollingdale (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997). 
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psychological effects of the “mania for history” contain much that should unsettle 
postmodern defenders of an ironic approach to politics. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 2 
 
THE PLACE OF HISTORY IN NIETZSCHE’S THOUGHT 
 
 
The second Untimely One (1874) brings to light what is dangerous and gnaws 
at and poisons life in our kind of traffic with science and scholarship—how 
life is made sick by this dehumanized and mechanical grinding of gears, the 
‘impersonality’ of the laborer, the false economy of the ‘division of labor.’  
The aim is lost, genuine culture—and the means, the modern traffic with 
science, barbarized.  In this essay the ‘historical sense’ of which this century 
is proud was recognized for the first time as a disease, as a typical symptom of 
decay.11 
 
Lack of historical sense is the family failing of all philosophers.12 
 
 
 Friedrich Nietzsche remains one of the most widely read philosophers of our time—a 
thinker whose name is as likely to arise in academic circles as in movies and television 
shows.  Unfortunately, he is not among the best understood.  Although his works are 
engrossing, they are often hard to follow, due in large part to an enigmatic, aphoristic writing 
style that eschews sober, reasoned analysis in favor of an approach employing sarcasm, 
irony, and intentional contradiction.  Perhaps it should come as no surprise, then, that the 
attempt to get down to what Nietzsche really said and meant has given rise to a flourishing 
publishing industry in which “almost certainly more books appear on him each year than any 
other thinker, thanks to the appeal he has for so many disparate schools of thought and anti-
                                                
11 Friedrich Nietzsche, Ecce Homo, in On the Genealogy of Morals and Ecce Homo, trans. Walter 
Kaufmann (New York: Vintage Books, 1989), The Untimely Ones 1, 276. 
 
12 Friedrich Nietzsche, Human, All Too Human: A Book for Free Spirits, trans. R. J. Hollingdale 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 1:2, 12. 
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thought.”13  Indeed, the last published edition of the International Nietzsche Bibliography, 
edited in 1968—long before the recent explosion of scholarly interest in Nietzsche—lists 
more than 4,500 titles in 27 languages devoted to the philosopher’s work.14   
Yet it has only been in recent years that scholars have given the writings of the Basel 
period, in particular the Untimely Meditations, their due treatment.  As a result of this 
attention, Nietzsche’s view of history and his treatment of it in On the Uses and 
Disadvantages of History for Life have come to the forefront, and heretofore forgotten and 
neglected works such as On the Future of German Educational Institutions have attracted a 
scholarly following as well.  Although the critical and interpretative literature on Nietzsche is 
too vast and intractable to give a full account of it here, I will attempt to outline in broad 
strokes the various scholarly approaches to Nietzsche’s philosophy in general and to the 
second Untimely Meditation in particular.  Perhaps not surprisingly, as is the case with such 
topics as perspectivism, the eternal recurrence, and the Übermensch, I find that scholars are 
sharply divided over their interpretations of Nietzsche’s understanding of history.   
 Nietzsche was not nearly so popular in life as in death.  Still yet to be recognized as a 
philosophical and cultural phenomenon in the fall of 1888, Nietzsche was undaunted by the 
failure of his works to reach the nobler spirits among the philosophically aware public, 
boldly declaring in the preface to The Antichrist that “some are born posthumously.”15  In 
fact, over the course of the twentieth century Nietzsche experienced not a single birth but 
                                                
13 Robert Scurton, Peter Singer, Christopher Janaway, and Michael Tanner, German Philosophers: 
Kant, Hegel, Schopenhauer, Nietzsche (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997). 
 
14 Bernd Magnus and Kathleen M. Higgins, eds., The Cambridge Companion to Nietzsche (New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 1-2. 
 
15 Walter Kaufmann, trans., The Antichrist, in The Portable Nietzsche (New York: Penguin Books, 
1976), 568. 
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multiple incarnations.  The Nazi Party’s appropriation of him as a spiritual and intellectual 
forebear during World War II led early interpreters to brand Nietzsche a “proto-Nazi” who 
“would have joined the Nazi party had he lived long enough.”16  Walter Kaufmann reviewed 
the Nazi literature on Nietzsche and deftly exposed its weaknesses in his Nietzsche: 
Philosopher, Psychologist, AntiChrist,17 the book that provided the basis for the long-
standing interpretation of Nietzsche as a “fundamentally anti-political” thinker who reviled 
the state and loathed its consequences for ethics and culture.18  Since then the complexity of 
his artistic vision has allowed thinkers on the political right to interpret Nietzsche variously 
as a German nationalist,19 a social Darwinist,20 and a thorough-going critic of liberalism,21 
while leftist commentators construe him as a socialist,22 an opponent of social Darwinism,23 
                                                
16 Bruce Detwiler, Nietzsche and the Politics of Aristocratic Radicalism (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1990), 1. 
 
17 Walter Kaufmann, Nietzsche: Philosopher, Psychologist, Antichrist (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1974). 
  
18 Detwiler, Nietzsche and the Politics of Aristocratic Radicalism, 37. 
 
19 Richard Oehler, Friedrich Nietzsche und die Deutsche Zukunft (Leipzig: Armanen, 1935). 
 
20 John T. Wilcox, Truth and Value in Nietzsche: A Study of His Metaphysics and Epistemology 
(University of Michigan Press, 1974).   John Richardson maintains that Nietzsche’s repeated 
denunciation and ridicule of Charles Darwin only served to alert his readers to the deep ambivalence 
he felt about the perceived social, political, and biological implications of the British naturalist’s 
theory.  See Nietzsche’s New Darwinism (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004).   
 
21 George A. Morgan, Jr., What Nietzsche Means (New York: Harper and Row, 1941); Fredrick 
Appel, Nietzsche Contra Democracy (Cornell University Press, 1999). 
 
22 Charles Andler, Nietzsche: Sa vie et sa pensèe, 6 vols. (Paris: Boassard, 190-31) 5(1929): 321. 
 
23 Lewis Call, “Anti-Darwin, Anti-Spencer: Friedrich Nietzsche’s Critique of Darwin and 
‘Darwinism’,” History of Science 36 (111): 1-22.  Kaufmann (1976) argues steadfastly against all 
Darwinian interpretations of Nietzsche’s thought (see 66, 118, 143, 294, and 317). 
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an existentialist,24 a pragmatist,25 and most recently, a liberal whose thinking is compatible 
with egalitarianism, constitutionalism, and democracy.26 
 The sheer breadth of Nietzsche’s thought—covering such topics as the practice of 
historiography, the superiority of Greek culture, the consequences of Christian morality, and 
the value of modern science—has allowed his twentieth century interpreters considerable 
leeway in determining which of his myriad concerns ought to be regarded as the most central 
to understanding Nietzsche or the most useful for diagnosing the ills of modern political life.  
Following suit, Mark Warren declares at the beginning of his study that, “knowing a 
thinker’s problematic is perhaps the most important thing we can know about the person’s 
thinking as a whole.”27  Virtually every author who has explored Nietzsche’s view of history 
                                                
24 Karl Jaspsers, Nietzsche: An Introduction to the Understanding of His Philosophical Activity 
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997); Alexander Nehamas, Nietzsche: Life as 
Literature (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1985). 
 
25 Posner, Richard A. “Past-Dependency, Pragmatism, and Critique of History in Adjudication and 
Legal Scholarship.” University of Chicago Law Review 67, no. 3 (Summer 2000): 573-606. 
 
26 Henry S. Kariel, “Nietzsche’s Preface to Constitutionalism,” Journal of Politics 25 (May 1963): 
211-225.  It is against those on the political left who are primarily interested in defending a politics of 
their own choosing through the instrumental and highly selective appropriation of Nietzsche’s 
thought (e.g., Emma Goldman, Michel Foucault, Jacques Derrida, Mark Warren) that Bruce Detwiler 
argues most directly, despite the fact that he is sympathetic to their political concerns.  For however 
odious we might find Nietzsche’s politics, “we stand guilty of both sanitizing and trivializing his 
[philosophical] contribution when we deliberately sweep up under the rug its unsavory political 
implications” (5).  While Kaufmann sought to save Nietzsche’s philosophical legacy from the editing 
of his unscrupulous sister Elizabeth and the propagandizing of the brutish Third Reich, Detwiler seeks 
to remind us that the man who lionized the likes of Caesar, Cesare Borgia, and Napoleon and alluded 
to supermen, blond beasts, master races, and breeding experiments is simply not a liberal.  Indeed, 
“Nietzsche’s artistic vision carries with it a willingness to aestheticize politics in ways that suggest 
distinct affinities with fascism” (113).  See Emma Goldman, Living My Life (Mineola, NY: Courier 
Dover Publications, 1970); Michel Foucault, “Nietzsche, Genealogy, History,” in The Foucault 
Reader, ed. Paul Rabinow (New York: Pantheon Books, 1984); Jacques Derrida, Spurs: Nietzsche’s 
Styles (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978); Mark Warren, Nietzsche and Political Thought 
(Cambridge: MIT Press, 1991).  
 
27 Warren, Nietzsche and Political Thought, 13. 
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and his treatment of it in the second Untimely Meditation agrees that while he remained a 
professor of philology at the University of Basel, Nietzsche regarded history as the central 
problem of modern philosophy.  That is, his philosophy begins with the realization that 
modern man is conscious of his own historicity; he defines himself as a historical product 
that can seek self-knowledge only on the basis of historical criticism.28  This historical 
sensibility, which the German poet and essayist Friedrich Schlegel dubbed Historism as early 
as 1797 to refer “a kind of philosophy” that “places its main emphasis on history,”29 
Nietzsche regarded as emblematic of philosophy in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.  
Since then the terms Historism and historicism (its English equivalent) have been used in 
confusing, sometimes diametrically opposed ways to refer to the same basic underlying 
commitment to historical understanding.  The historicism that Nietzsche criticizes in the 
second Untimely Meditation is a conflation of many senses of the term, best summarized 
perhaps as “a congeries of attitudes based on the assumption that the best way to understand 
a thing is to explain it historically and the recognition that everything human is subject to 
change.”30 
                                                
28 Catherine Zuckert, “Nature, History, and the Self: Fr. Nietzsche’s Untimely Considerations,” 
Nietzsche-Studien 5 (1976): 55-56. 
 
29 Georg G. Iggers, “Historicism,” in Dictionary of the History of Ideas: Studies of Selected Pivotal 
Ideas, ed. Philip P. Wiener, vol. 2, Despotism to Law, Common (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 
1973), 456. 
 
30 Harry Ritter, Dictionary of Concepts in History (New York: Greenwood Press, 1986), 186.  For a 
fine exposition of the ways in which the word historicism has been variously used—and is still being 
used—see Maurice Mandelbaum, History, Man, and Reason: A Study in Nineteenth Century Thought 
(Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1971). 
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 Broadly conceived, the scholarly literature on the second of the polemical essays that 
form the Untimely Meditations can be divided into two categories. 31  The first category 
consists of works by commentators who characterize Nietzsche’s early undertaking as a 
timeless consideration of the cultural value of history—one that offers definite prescriptions 
for placing history in the service of human excellence; as such Nietzsche is to be regarded as 
a critic of historicism rather than its advocate.  These scholars argue that the aim of 
Nietzsche’s histories is not to expose the problematic foundations of both morality and 
knowledge but to discover and relay enduring knowledge about human nature and the rank 
order of forms of human life.  They perceive no radical intellectual shifts in Nietzsche’s 
thought after the period of the Untimely Meditations (at least insofar as the problem of 
history is concerned), preferring to focus less on his epistemological doctrines than on his 
experiments in cultural criticism.   
 For example, Peter Berkowitz contends in his article “Nietzsche’s Ethics of History” 
that, along with Nietzsche’s three other historically oriented studies—The Birth of Tragedy 
(1872), On the Genealogy of Morals (1886), and The Antichrist (1888)—On the Uses and 
Disadvantages of History for Life serves as a major attempt to “derive lessons about art, 
morality, religion, politics, and philosophy from the study of ancient [Greek] history,” thus 
reflecting the “remarkable unity of his thought.”32  So far from implying the “artificiality and 
transitoriness of moral and political standards,” Nietzsche’s speculative histories take the 
                                                
31 For Nietzsche’s own assessment of the tenor of these early essays, see Friedrich Nietzsche, Ecce 
Homo, in On the Genealogy of Morals and Ecce Homo, trans. Walter Kaufmann (New York: Vintage 
Books, 1989), “The Untimely Ones,” 276:  “The four Untimely Ones are certainly warlike.  They 
prove that I was no Jack the Dreamer, that I take pleasure in fencing—perhaps also that I am 
dangerously quick at the draw.”   
 
32 Peter Berkowitz, “Nietzsche’s Ethics of History,” Review of Politics 56, no. 1 (Winter 1994), 8.  
Reprinted in Nietzsche: The Ethics of an Immoralist (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1995). 
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possibility of objective historical knowledge, especially knowledge about morality, for 
granted.33  What the genuine historian must concern himself with is the value of historical 
knowledge, its moral significance for the lives of individual human beings and the health of a 
culture. Echoing the perception of doctrinal unity between the Untimely Meditations and 
Nietzsche’s later writings, Werner Dannhauser asserts in his essay “ Friedrich Nietzsche” 
that the German philosopher  
never repudiated but only deepened the view of his time as sick and critical, a view 
which is to be found in the writings of his first stage of development; and the 
problems he raised at this stage are problems with which he never ceased to wrestle.34 
 
 Emphasizing the timeless nature of Nietzsche’s historical typology, Catherine Zuckert 
and Laurence Lampert dedicate considerable portions of their analyses of the second 
Untimely Meditation to elaborating upon the so called three pure species of history: 
monumental, antiquarian, and critical. 35  These scholars recognize that each of these 
approaches to history proves advantageous to life in its own way—the monumental, by 
highlighting mankind’s greatest achievements and providing man with suitable models for 
emulation; the antiquarian, by inspiring pride in his origins and cultivating an attitude of 
reverence for the past of his people; and the critical, by equipping him with the tools to 
critically reassess the present and negate the past when necessary.  Certainly no section of On 
the Uses and Disadvantages of History for Life has garnered more scholarly attention than 
the one that contains these three famous categories.  Unfortunately, however, very little has 
                                                
33 Berkowitz, “Nietzsche’s Ethics of History,” 8-9. 
 
34 Werner J. Dannhauser, “Friedrich Nietzsche,” in History of Political Philosophy, 3d ed, eds. Leo 
Strauss and Joseph Cropsey (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987), 829. 
 
35 Laurence Lampert, Nietzsche and Modern Times (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1993), 281-
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been articulated in terms that amount to more than paraphrase (what Brian Leiter refers to as 
the “bane of the Nietzsche literature”).36  Nor, surprisingly, has anyone attempted to 
speculate about what written history might look like were a historian willing to practice his 
craft in the vein prescribed by Nietzsche’s historiography. 
The second category of scholarly literature on Nietzsche’s meditation on history, by 
contrast, comprises works by commentators who view Nietzsche’s early philosophical 
efforts, including The Birth of Tragedy and the Untimely Meditations, as transitional, albeit 
important, texts in his corpus, but not representative of Nietzsche’s final view of the value of 
historical research. They argue that beginning with the writing of Human, All Too Human 
(1878), Nietzsche changed his views on history to include a genealogical approach to moral 
inquiry, one that scarcely admits of absolutes with regard to knowledge or morality.  They 
more readily acknowledge intellectual shifts in what has been characterized as Nietzsche’s 
early, middle, and late periods, and are thus more likely to face the contradictions and 
confusions inherent in the total of Nietzsche’s philosophy. 
For example, in “Nietzsche’s View of the Value of Historical Studies and Methods” 
Thomas H. Brobjer scours Nietzsche’s writings after the second Untimely Meditation for 
evidence that would suggest an ongoing confrontation with the problem of historical 
knowledge identified in that early text.  Instead, he finds an explicit rejection of the earlier 
writings, encapsulated in a note written in 1877: 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
36 Brian Leiter, Nietzsche on Morality (New York: Routledge, 2002), xiii. 
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I want expressly to inform the readers of my earlier writings [i.e., The Birth of 
Tragedy and the Untimely Meditations] that I have abandoned the metaphysical-
artistic views that fundamentally govern them: they are pleasant but untenable.  He 
who speaks publicly is usually quickly forced to publicly retract his statements.37 
 
Regarding the second Untimely Meditation in particular, Nietzsche wrote little about it after 
1874.  The few explicit references to it are critical and dismissive, as is his 1883 remark that 
“Behind my first period grins the face of Jesuitism: I mean the deliberate holding on to 
illusion and the forcible annexation of illusion as the foundation of culture.”38  To be sure, 
Nietzsche regarded the early essays as necessary occasions for learning.  But in 1885, faced 
with the decision to write prefaces for his works in preparation for possible new editions, he 
declined the opportunity to revisit any of the Untimely Meditations.  If Nietzsche himself had 
such serious reservations about the intellectual content of his work, it would seem to be a 
serious mistake to embark upon a study of Nietzsche’s history essay on the assumption that it 
represents his final, authoritative views on the subject.  
Some of the best insights into the second Untimely Meditation have been gained by 
attempting to uncover Nietzsche’s impetus for writing the essay in the first place.  Christian 
J. Emden’s “Toward a Critical Historicism: History and Politics in Nietzsche’s Second 
‘Untimely Meditation’” serves as the best recent piece of scholarship on the essay inasmuch 
as it succeeds in linking the crisis of historical culture Nietzsche describes with the political 
culture of the new German nation-state after the Franco-Prussian War.  So far from being a 
timeless, abstract meditation on the value of history for life, Nietzsche’s essay 
                                                
37 Quoted in Thomas J. Brober, “Nietzsche’s View of the Value of Historical Studies and Methods,” 
Journal of the History of Ideas 65, no. 2 (April 2004):  304. 
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reacts to rather specific developments within his contemporary intellectual context; 
the establishment of specific historical foundation myths for a new German nation 
state, exemplified by the public monuments and commemorations of the 1870s, play a 
crucial role in this context as does the effect of such foundation myths of the political 
imagination of historical scholarship.39 
 
In assessing the coherence of Nietzsche’s argument, however, Emden finds (as did nearly all 
of Nietzsche’s contemporaries) that it is not wholly convincing, primarily because it is so 
abstract and devoid of concrete examples.  For instance, what does Nietzsche mean when he 
says that the excessive study of history enfeebles one’s instinct for creation?  Why should 
modern man believe that he is an epigone?   Is our own age plagued by a dangerous mood of 
irony and cynicism?  
 Curiously, relatively few English language scholarly articles and book chapters on 
Nietzsche’s second Untimely Meditation remark upon the sections of Nietzsche’s essay that 
constitute a far more elaborate explanation of the five respects in which a hypertrophy of the 
historical sense proves disadvantageous for life.  If the three categories of history—
monumental, antiquarian, and critical—embody Nietzsche’s prescription for a cure to the 
sickness that plagued his age (and, presumably, or own), he apparently thought the record of 
the illness’s diagnosis more immediately important, at least insofar as the organization and 
weight of his text can serve as a reliable guide.  (Of the essay’s eleven sections, including the 
foreword, six of the eleven are dedicated to a topic almost universally ignored in the 
scholarly literature).  In any case, Nietzsche’s reasons for the inclusion of these sections 
sufficiently undermine Walter Kaufmann’s assessment that such a “lengthy development” is 
“altogether of subordinate importance.”40   
                                                
39 Christian J. Emden, “Toward a Critical Historicism: History and Politics in Nietzsche’s Second 
‘Untimely Meditation’,” Modern Intellectual History 3, no. 1 (2006): 2. 
 
40 Kaufmann, Nietzsche, 144. 
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 Despite the fact that the second Untimely Meditation is part of Nietzsche’s juvenilia, 
its insights ought not be discounted solely on the basis of their author’s youthful exuberance.  
In doing so, scholars have fallen prey to some of the same academic pitfalls Nietzsche 
describes in his essay: attempting to understand the man and his thought in relation to a 
historical period, or in terms of his intellectual development, rather than simply on its own 
terms.  Because large portions of the essay have been heretofore ignored, I want to study 
these sections carefully to determine whether Nietzsche’s explanation of the consequences of 
historicism for nineteenth century German culture can help us understand better the cultural 
and political uses to which history is best put.  In particular, I aim to recover the critical 
aspects of Nietzsche’s thought that will allow us to evaluate the consequences of historical 
education for culture, academics, and, indeed, the practice of philosophy. 
However, in order to understand Nietzsche’s enumeration and explanation of the 
consequences of historicism, the nature of the problem as he sees it must be made clear.  In 
the next chapter I will begin to outline in broad strokes the problem Nietzsche identifies 
precisely where he himself starts, through an analysis of the Foreword of On the Uses and 
Disadvantages of History for Life.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 3 
 
THE INVOCATION OF GOETHE AGAINST THE  
CHANGING DIRECTION OF HISTORICAL RESEARCH 
 
 
The special business of philosophy in the present… The mania for history.41 
 
The falseness of a judgment is for us not necessarily an objection to a 
judgment; in this respect our new language may sound strangest.  The 
question is to what extent it is life-promoting, life preserving, species-
preserving, perhaps even species-cultivating.42 
 
 
 It is clear from the numerous sketches, fragments, false starts, epigrams, outlines, and 
plans that abound in Nietzsche’s notebooks and letters that he was, above all, a man of 
projects.43  Although his philosophical output was prolific (for twenty years he published 
almost one book per year before his creative life abruptly ended), the existence of hundreds 
of pages of notes attest to the fact that Nietzsche perished—first intellectually, then 
physically—with a spate of books still within him.  In some cases, Nietzsche’s prefaces for 
planned works were worked over and polished for so long that detailed argumentation may 
have finally proven superfluous.  Even so, because of their efficiency and perspicacity, one 
can easily sense what Nietzsche intended to argue.  Thus while On the Uses and 
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42 Friedrich Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil: Prelude to a Philosophy of the Future, trans. Walter 
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Disadvantages of History for Life is the second of the four Untimely Meditations he 
eventually completed and published (he originally planned to write as many as thirteen), its 
foreword contains the whole of the essay’s argument.  In it, he reveals his concern that while 
history can promote, preserve, and moderate genuine culture, it can also impede and destroy 
it.  In questioning the worth of the “mighty historical movement” of which his age is so 
manifestly proud, Nietzsche labors as a physician of culture, as the philosopher who must 
determine the value of knowledge and the level to which this new science of history ought to 
be allowed to develop.44  Nietzsche’s lamentations over the decadent state of German 
historical culture thus begin with an explicit identification of the problem, and in doing so he 
enlists the help of a man of letters, a man for whom he has almost unqualified praise. 
Nietzsche begins his consideration of the value of history with a quotation from one 
of German culture’s greatest luminaries, the poet Johann Wolfgang Von Goethe: “In any 
case, I hate everything that merely instructs me without augmenting or directly invigorating 
my activity.”45  Goethe takes it for granted that a direct relationship should exist between 
knowledge and life and that a standard exists by which people ought to judge the worthiness 
of particular teachings.  In admitting his disdain for knowledge that has no apparent effects 
on his life, he expresses implicitly a preference for instruction that, when properly 
assimilated into his consciousness, results in either the commencement of new action or the 
enlivening of energetic activity already in progress.  Thus Goethe himself teaches that 
knowledge has a purpose: to serve life.  People ought to discriminate—on the basis of its 
usefulness for life—against knowledge that “merely instructs” (and is therefore best 
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ignored—if indeed it is possible simply to ignore what one has seen and learned) in favor of 
knowledge that “invigorates” one’s life (and is therefore worthy of acquisition). 
 While Goethe condemns knowledge that “merely instructs” because it is practically 
useless, he does not disallow the possibility that such knowledge is simply innocuous.  If 
contemptible, knowledge that fails to invigorate—useless knowledge—need not be regarded 
as pernicious.  Nietzsche, however, denies that knowledge can be at the same time useless 
and without detrimental consequences for human life.  He admits that history, understood as 
both the knowledge gained from the study of the past and the recognition of one’s own 
historicity, is still needed.  But insofar as the “superfluous is the enemy of the necessary,” 
knowledge of the past valued for its own sake can become an unfortunate obstacle to living 
well in the present. 46  The sentiment is roughly the same as that of the old Chinese proverb, 
“He who swims not against the current swims backwards.”  The study of history, in other 
words, “can be valued to such a degree that life becomes stunted and degenerate.”47  Some 
historical knowledge, while true, simply cannot be borne by a man, a people, or a culture if it 
wishes to remain healthy. 48  By Nietzsche’s analysis, the choice with which man is faced is 
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48 Nietzsche’s omnibus critique of the German historical sense alternates at various points between 
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tragic: man can either know the truth and perish or dwell in error and live.49  Or, as he poses 
the alternatives in the concluding section of his essay, either life is to “dominate knowledge 
and science,” or knowledge is to dominate, indeed, annihilate life.  For Nietzsche there can 
be no doubt as to which of the two forces is higher. 50  Because “knowledge presupposes life 
and thus has in the preservation of life the same interest any creature has in its own continued 
existence,” man must recognize life as the dominating force. 51  The indiscriminate 
knowledge drive is in effect the will to death; man should serve history only to the extent that 
it serves life. 
 Just as historians ought not study the past for its own sake, Nietzsche warns that 
history ought neither serve mere survival nor perpetuate “the self-seeking life and the base 
and cowardly action.”52  Unlike Thomas Hobbes, for whom the fear of violent death is the 
most powerful passion and the liberty for self-preservation is a right of nature, Nietzsche 
does not defend philosophically the conservation of life in the basest, biological sense. 53  
                                                
49 Here I preserve Nietzsche’s use of gendered term ‘man’ because it is what he uses throughout the 
second Untimely Meditation.  When making claims about human nature, Nietzsche typically employs 
the word ‘man’ in the traditional philosophical sense to refer to all human beings—mankind—men 
and women alike.  However, it is important to note that his philosophy often reflects at least some of 
the male chauvanism of his times—most notably that of his mentor, Arthur Schopenhauer.  For 
example, Nietzsche never admits of the possibility that one of his ‘genuine’ historians might happen 
to be an especially gifted woman.  This is in keeping with many of the notoriously mysognostic and 
sarcastic remarks he made regarding women.  See, for example, Beyond Good and Evil, 238, 167: “A 
man...must always think about women as Orientals do: he must coneive of woman as a possession, as 
property that can be locked, as something predestined for service and achieving her perfection in 
that.” 
 
50 Nietzsche, On the Uses and Disadvantages of History for Life, 10.10, 121. 
 
51 Nietzsche, On the Uses and Disadvantages of History for Life, Foreword, 10.10, 121. 
 
52 Nietzsche, On the Uses and Disadvantages of History for Life, Foreword, 59. 
 
53 Thomas Hobbes, The Citizen: Philosophical Rudiments Concerning Government and Society, in 
Man and Citizen, ed. Bernard Gert (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1991), 1.7, 115;  
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Instead, he implores historians to practice their craft as artists commissioned to advance the 
“higher life,” to promote “true culture,” and to secure the “unity of German spirit and life.”54  
Although these locutions reveal little about the constitution of the future culture Nietzsche 
hopes to inaugurate, each betrays an element of the critique of the present culture he finds so 
lacking.  His fellow Germans lead lives that are regrettably low; they habituate themselves to 
a culture that is detrimentally false; and they refuse allegiance to a nation whose spirit is 
divided.  Nietzsche is not so much worried, then, about the extinction of man as a species as 
he is concerned for the fate of man subject to cultural decline.  A strong European culture is 
needed to rule all of mankind.  When he recommends that history serve life, he has in mind a 
particular form of life morally superior to, and higher with respect to virtue than the form of 
life experienced by his contemporaries.  Through his enumeration of the vices of nineteenth 
century German historical culture, Nietzsche contributes to our understanding of the virtues 
of genuine culture. 
 Because he disparages German historians as “idler[s] in the garden of knowledge”55 
and derides their work as a neurotic fixation indifferent to the ends and requirements of true 
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54 Nietzsche, On the Uses and Disadvantages of History for Life, 3.3, 75; 4.3, 80; Foreword, 59; 4.6, 
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55 Nietzsche, On the Uses and Disadvantages of History for Life, Foreword, 59.  Nietzsche intends 
that his readers recall the remarks made by Doctor Pangloss in the final chapter of Francois Marie 
Arouet deVoltaire’s Candide.  Responding to Candide’s suggestion that he, Cunégode, Martin, and 
the rest would do well to forego all further attempts at philosophical investigation and simply 
cultivate their garden, Pangloss comments, “You’re right, for when man was placed in the garden of 
Eden, he was placed there ut operaretur eum—that he might work—which proves that man was not 
born to rest [or idle].”  Even at the end of a harrowing adventure whose characters suffer the evils of 
exile, disease, rape, enslavement, murder, and cannibalism, Pangloss maintains that all of it was 
necessary for the best end, and that, through the sufficient exercise of reason and the acceptance of 
the logic of cause and effect, one must still recognize this as “the best of all possible worlds.”  He 
opts to contemplate rather than toil.  In much the same fashion that Voltaire satirizes the philosophical 
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culture, Nietzsche rightly anticipates harsh retaliation from the community of scholars he 
targets.  What little effort he makes to diminish the sting of his invective he offers in the 
spirit of Plato’s Socrates.  Nietzsche appeals to sympathy when he claims that he makes his 
criticisms of German culture public first and foremost to release himself from the inner 
torment they cause him; he gestures at humility when he suggests that his arguments will 
provoke nothing more than an occasion for others to praise the German historical movement 
he criticizes.  And, in a doubly ironic closing remark, he acknowledges that the response 
from his critics will provide him with something he values more than respectability: chiefly, 
the opportunity to learn the truth about the character of his time.56  Not only does he admit 
the possibility of ignorance when his every argument attests to the greater likelihood that he 
knows the truth, he justifies his work on the ground that it is likely to yield a gain in 
                                                
system of Optimism promulgated by Gottfried Wilhelm Leibnitz, Nietzsche criticizes the philosophy 
of History initiated by Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel.  Hegel and his followers are hardly any less 
naïve and dogmatic than Leibnitz and his disciples in that while the latter teach that an omniscient, 
omnipotent, and benevolent God created the best possible world, the former proclaim that their age is 
“the necessary result of [the] world-process,” and that every event that happens is a “victory of the 
logical or the ‘idea’.”  Nietzsche denies that history is either the byproduct of Providence or the work 
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existence results in what he calls the “Idolatry of the factual,” a stance towards the world that does not 
promote life.  Germany’s historians resemble Doctor Pangloss inasmuch as they attempt to uncover 
the facts of the past merely to account for the reality of the present.  Like Pangloss, they refuse to 
either admit the bounds of their knowledge or concede the necessity of restraint.  And finally, what 
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56 Nietzsche, On the Uses and Disadvantages of History for Life, Foreword, 59-60.  Here Nietzsche 
echoes the Socrates of Plato’s Gorgias, who places himself among the few who take greater pleasure 
in being refuted when in error than in refuting others who are mistaken: “For I consider it a greater 
good, to the extent that it is a greater good to be released one-self from the greatest evil than to release 
another.  For I think that nothing is so great an evil for a human being as false opinion about the 
things that our argument now happens to be about.”  See Plato, Gorgias, trans. James H. Nichols Jr. 
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998), 458a-b, 40. 
 
 25 
knowledge, if only for himself.  Nietzsche feigns a scholarly interest in knowledge typical of 
German intellectuals and, in doing so, mocks the disinterested historians he imitates. 
 The academic historians to whom Nietzsche refers understood themselves to be part 
of a larger tradition of German historiography that began as early as the eighteenth century 
and lasted well into the early twentieth century.  Part of this discourse or philosophy that is 
now referred to simply as historicism included philosophers such as Johann Gottfried von 
Herder, G. W. F. Hegel, Auguste Comte, Karl Marx, and Herbert Spencer.  Although their 
philosophical systems were in many respects mutually incompatible, these thinkers were 
united by belief in a “transcendent stream of history,” the idea that history develops toward a 
particular end according to predetermined laws.57 Hegelians, for example, postulated human 
freedom as the end for their teleological conception of history; Marxists similarly understood 
the classless society as the end of an unyielding chain of historical development.  Insofar as 
Nietzsche is concerned with conceptions of history that only serve to legitimate the present, 
that encourage us to be complacent with the culture we are born into or the politics to which 
we are accustomed, this is the historicism (Historizimus) that he takes umbrage with in the 
second Untimely Meditation. 
 However, there is a second understanding of historicism (Historismus) that Nietzsche 
also criticizes throughout the essay.  Nietzsche conflates the two understandings by 
describing them variously as the “historical sense,” but context makes clear which 
conception he is undermining at any given time.  Here historicism designates a specific 
conception of the past usually associated with such historians as Leopold von Ranke and 
Wilhelm von Humboldt.  These thinkers emphasized historical development as well, but in a 
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different way.  Rather than trying to judge historical events according to how well they fit 
with certain norms and values postulated a priori by philosophers of history, these historians 
emphasized the individuality of every historical epoch and every historical event. They 
argued that historical phenomena—whether individual people or cultural institutions such as 
states and religions—developed according to their own unique principles and could not be 
understood in terms of universal law.  According to Ranke in particular, then, the task of the 
historian is simply to establish empirically, through the careful study of primary sources, 
‘how [the past] actually was” (wie es eigentlich gewesen).  So far from making normative 
judgments about the events of the past, the historian’s true task is to extinguish his own 
personality from his work as far as possible. 
 Nietzsche worried, however, that the cultivation of the noble dream of so-called 
objective history encouraged a kind of cultural and ethical relativism that proved detrimental 
to society.  Here again, his decision to invoke Goethe at the beginning of an essay calling for 
the revival of German culture proves instructive.  Although Nietzsche manifests a reverence 
for Goethe rivaled only by his respect for his other (later rejected) philosophical hero, Arthur 
Schopenhauer, he considers the former a historical curiosity that bears particular relevance to 
the present topic.58  He remarks in one of his latter works that 
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in a certain sense the nineteenth century also strove for all that which Goethe as a 
person had striven for: universality in understanding and in welcoming, letting 
everything come close to oneself, an audacious realism, a reverence for everything 
actual.  How is it that the over-all result is no Goethe, but chaos, a nihilistic sigh, an 
utter bewilderment, an instinct of weariness…?59 
 
Goethe indulged his drive to knowledge, embracing every field of human endeavor including 
science, politics, literature, and philosophy.  His studies culminated in the self-creation of 
one of the paramount figures of world literature, and his dramatic poem Faust betrays in both 
its form and its content a mastery of the Western philosophic and literary tradition.  Goethe, 
in short, exemplified the kind of “strong personality” Nietzsche explains is necessary in order 
to bear the weight of history.60  He constitutes the extraordinary case for whom the entire 
spectacle of history is exhausted solely in the service of life.  In the service of history, 
unfortunately, nineteenth century German culture has itself become exhausted.  Nietzsche 
invokes Goethe not only to remind his contemporaries of the heights of individual artistic and 
intellectual achievement possible when a man of strong personality draws upon the whole of 
human accomplishment, but also to juxtapose his example to the depths of cultural decadence 
certain when men of weak personality suffer the burden of historical knowledge. 
 The failure of Nietzsche’s contemporaries to regard their culture’s inundation of 
historical information as burdensome prompts his radical consideration of the meaning of 
history for man and its relation to human life.  Confronting an audience composed largely of 
academics that proclaim erudition and knowledge of the highest ideals, Nietzsche questions 
whether history contributes to the greater end of life and, indeed, happiness.  His 
philosophical probing betrays a complex set of ontological and anthropological views 
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concerning the relationship between history and the self, memory and morality, time and 
politics.  In this section of the essay, Nietzsche attempts to reconcile the inescapable 
historicity of human existence with the need humans feel to affirm their creative capacities, 
thereby overcoming both themselves and their pasts.  It is to this highly original and 
illuminating discussion that we now turn our focus. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 4 
 
THE HISTORICAL, UNHISTORICAL, AND SUPRAHISTORICAL SENSES 
 
 
The valuation ‘I believe that this and that is so’ as the essence of ‘truth.’  In 
valuations are expressed conditions of preservation and growth.  All our 
organs of knowledge and our senses are developed only with regard to 
conditions of preservation and growth.  Trust in reason and its categories, in 
dialectic, therefore the valuation of logic, proves only their usefulness for life, 
proved by experience—not that something is true. 
 That a great deal of belief must be present; that judgments may be 
ventured; that doubt concerning all essential values is lacking—that is the 
precondition of every living thing and its life.  Therefore, what is needed is 
that something must be held to be true—not that something is true.61 
 
Not the power to remember, but its very opposite, the power to forget, is a 
necessary condition for our existence. 
         Sholem Asch 
 
 
 As has been mentioned, most commentators on the second Untimely Meditation limit 
their discussion of the work to Nietzsche’s influential distinction between the monumental, 
antiquarian, and critical approaches to historical study.  In doing so, however, they ignore the 
extent to which his understanding of the substantive content of history depends upon having 
understood correctly man’s everyday experience of the world and his relationship to history.  
Nietzsche’s foray into historiography is therefore preceded by an exercise in psychology.  
What it reveals is an ultimately antagonistic relationship between man and history—one that 
has profound consequences for the continued adherence to moral standards and the survival 
of culture. 
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In order to establish history as a principal cause of man’s distress, Nietzsche asks his 
readers to consider the condition of animals.62  The cows of the herd feed, sleep, digest, and 
frolic every day from dawn to dusk, aware of no difference between today and yesterday.  
They suffer neither sadness nor boredom because they are enthralled by every individual 
moment’s pleasure or pain.  As animals they cannot help but forget; thus they live 
continually in the present, remembering nothing about the past and expecting nothing from 
the future.  Man, by contrast, cannot help but remember and “clings relentlessly to the past,” 
no matter how earnestly he attempts to forget it.63  The oppressive weight of the past 
encumbers his every action, and the constant anticipation of the future hinders his enjoyment 
of the present.  An unfortunate awareness of time makes possible man’s unique experience of 
struggle, suffering, and satiety, all of which make him long for the “blissful blindness” of 
both the animal that knows only the present and the child who has no past to deny. 64   
 Much as Aristotle understands man to be the only animal that possesses “reasoned 
speech,” Nietzsche argues that man’s faculty of memory distinguishes him from the animals 
insofar as it determines his capacity for recollection and imagination.  Animals have no 
memory of the past; thus they live unhistorically. 65  That is, they live only with an awareness 
for present immediacy, ignorant of the temporal categories of past and future.  Man, on the 
other hand, remembers the past and cannot evade it; thus he lives historically.  That is, he 
gives meaning to his experience with an awareness of the passage of time, attentive to both 
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65 Aristotle, The Politics, trans. Peter L. Phillips Simpson (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina 
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the past and the future.  The historical sense simultaneously bolsters man’s pride in his place 
above the rest of the animals and makes him envious of their “untroubled stupor.”66  For even 
if the happiness that animals enjoy is “the smallest happiness,” because it is experienced as 
one long uninterrupted moment, man cannot hope to share in a happiness as great.67  
However—and this is Nietzsche’s central point—insofar as he experiences any happiness at 
all, he does so only while he is able, if only for a brief moment, to forget, “to feel 
unhistorically during its duration.”68   
 Nietzsche understands the requisite for happiness to be the ability to settle “on the 
threshold of the moment and forget all the past.”69  A man who could forget nothing would 
be so overwhelmed by the deluge of historical information that he could not possibly derive 
any meaning or order from the chaotic totality of his experience.  Deprived of any “fixed 
points by which to take his bearings,” he would “no longer believe in his own being, would 
no longer believe in himself,…and would lose himself in the stream of becoming.”70  A man 
without the power to forget would be entirely devoid of the inclination to act and would thus 
be completely incapacitated for life.  Nietzsche, therefore, argues that man’s happiness 
depends on his ontological relationship to, and experience of the world.  A man who at all 
times perceives the world as constant flux and believes that all things change (or come into 
being) without any inherent purpose or direction can never be truly happy, for if nothing 
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endures then he will find nothing of any particular value of importance.  Indeed, if he denies 
the existence of any stable entities, he will, “like a true pupil of Heraclitus,…hardly dare to 
raise a finger.”71  Man acts only when he thinks his actions meaningful—when his 
experience of the world leads him to believe that some things simply are, perfectly and 
unchangeably.  When man forgets utterly, he loses himself in the moment, and its duration 
closely approximates the experience of Being that grants man a chance at happiness.     
  Nietzsche considers the experience of the unhistorical so vital to human life that he 
compares it to an enveloping “atmosphere within which alone life can germinate and with the 
destruction of which it must vanish.”72  The unhistorical does not necessarily incline man to 
justice, for giving each man his due usually entails nuanced historical considerations inimical 
to immediate action.  However, in its absence the painter would never strive to imitate 
nature’s beauty; the army general would never risk life and limb; and the people would never 
attain their freedom.73  Not only would man never achieve happiness for himself, he would 
never work to secure happiness for others.74  Because the unhistorical is the region in which 
the greatest, and indeed all noteworthy deeds of mankind have been performed, the ever-
                                                
71 Nietzsche, On the Uses and Disadvantages of History for Life, 1.3, 62.  Here Nietzsche alludes to 
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the picture of Milesian philosophy: “And further, it was because of seeing all nature around us in 
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increasing encroachment of the historical upon the unhistorical puts cultures at risk of 
atrophy.  
Still, inasmuch as the past can be employed in the betterment of the present and the 
advancement of true culture, man must somehow determine the “boundary at which the past 
has to be forgotten” before the wealth of historical knowledge becomes a liability.75  
Nietzsche identifies this boundary line dividing the historical from the unhistorical as a living 
thing’s “horizon.”76  A man draws a horizon around himself to set limits to his world, to 
determine what must be included and excluded from his consciousness if he is to remain 
healthy, vigorous, and productive.  The “protective and veiling cloud” of the unhistorical 
shrouds in an unilluminable darkness “his fundamental set of assumptions about all things” 
and “what he considers the absolute truth which he cannot question.”77  Through his 
experience of the unhistorical man finds meaning in his existence, gives human suffering a 
purpose, and brings order to the senseless onslaught of experience.  Within the confines of an 
unhistorical horizon, man can safely cultivate his historical sense, bringing to light the 
knowledge of the traditions, laws, religions, and philosophies of both foreign and past 
cultures for the purposes of self-development and the elevation of present culture. The 
historical is equally necessary to the good health of a man because it allows him to recover 
from his wounds, redeem his losses, and refashion damaged cultural molds.78  If injustice or 
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disaster should give him pause to reconsider his way of life, knowledge of the past and the 
foreign allows him to discard what has been outlived for the sake of future health. 
 The value of the historical and the unhistorical vantage points having been 
established, Nietzsche concludes the second section of his essay with a consideration of the 
worth of the supra-historical point of view for health and life.  In language that anticipates 
his doctrine of the eternal recurrence,79 Nietzsche speculates that if a person were to ask his 
friends whether they would be tempted by the opportunity to “relive the past ten or twenty 
years,”all of his acquaintances surely would answer “No”—albeit for decidedly different 
reasons. 80  Some would decline the offer in the hopes that in the next twenty years they could 
achieve a happiness never realized during the previous two decades.  Nietzsche identifies this 
lot as historical men; they would answer “No” because of their underlying faith in the future 
and their characteristic belief that the meaning of human life and existence “will come more 
and more to light in the course of its process.”81  Inasmuch as they believe in an order to 
things that constantly eludes them and look to the past only to desire the future more acutely, 
they “in fact think and act unhistorically,” despite their apparent preoccupation with 
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man must live through the same sequence of events over and over again.  A gruesome notion to 
contemplate given the pain, suffering, and fruitless search for meaning that characterizes so much of 
life, Nietzsche considers it an existential imperative to face this prospect with enthusiasm rather than 
despair. See Nietzsche, The Gay Science, Translator’s Introduction, 5, 15-21;  341, 273-274. 
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history.82  Others, however, would reject the proposition on the grounds that in the next ten 
years they could learn nothing that they did not already discern during the last decade.  
Nietzsche identifies this rare lot as supra-historical men; they would answer “No” because of 
their fundamental perception of the unity of the past and the present and their fundamental 
doubt that salvation will come through the relentless study of history.  Inasmuch as they 
perceive an order to things that constantly presents itself to them and acknowledge the 
“omnipresence of imperishable types,” they achieve a supra-historical vantage point from 
which they observe the never-ending but repetitive stories of nations and individual men. 83 
 Because the supra-historical man transcends all horizons—recognizing horizons as 
mere horizons and illusions—Nietzsche surmises that the ceaseless repetition of human 
events must reduce him to satiety and eventually to nausea.84  Insofar as this symptom of 
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84 Nietzsche, On the Uses and Disadvantages of History for Life, 1.8,66.  Elsewhere, Nietzsche’s 
understanding of the experience characteristic of the supra-historical vantage point serves as the basis 
for an unorthodox interpretation of Hamlet’s infamous inaction:  “In this sense the Dionysian man 
resembles Hamlet: both have once looked truly into the essence of things, they have gained 
knowledge, and nausea inhibits action; for their action could not change anything in the eternal nature 
of things; they feel it to be ridiculous or humiliating that they should be asked to set right a world that 
is out of joint.  Knowledge kills action; action requires the veils of illusion: that is the doctrine if 
Hamlet, not that cheap wisdom of Jack the Dreamer who reflects too much and, as it were, from an 
excess of possibilities does not get around to action.  Not reflection, no—true knowledge, an insight 
into the horrible truth, outweighs any motive for action, both in Hamlet and in the Dionysian man. 
 Now no comfort avails any more; longing transcends a world after death, even the gods; 
existence is negated along with its glittering reflection in the gods or in an immortal beyond.  
Conscious of the truth he has once seen, man now sees everywhere only the horror or absurdity of 
existence; now he understands what is symbolic in Ophelia’s fate; now he understands the wisdom of 
the sylvan god, Silenus: he is nauseated.”   
 By Nietzsche’s account, Hamlet is not an ambivalent, grief-stricken prince torn between the 
pagan, Stoic, and Christian heroic ideals emphasizing anger and action, self-control and inner-
reflection, and patience and forgiveness, respectively.  Were he simply paralyzed by his inner 
torments, he would be characterized rightly as suffering from an excess of the historical sense.  
Rather, as Paul Cantor explains, Hamlet is a “cosmopolitan prince” whose supra-historical stance 
allows him to realize the ultimate worthlessness of all forms of political virtue, and knowledge of this 
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sickness is the result of wisdom, Nietzsche, therefore, juxtaposes wisdom—the end pursuit of 
traditional philosophy—to life, and deems a certain measure of unwisdom necessary for the 
health of any national culture.  Man, no less than peoples and cultures, needs enveloping 
illusions, and the historians Nietzsche criticizes do their fellow man and their nation a 
disservice by discrediting the comprehensive mythologies that serve as the basis for their 
laws, customs, and traditions.  He warns that if history continues on its current trajectory and 
becomes a “pure, sovereign science,”85 it puts the future health of any culture at risk, for in 
revealing the “delusion, the injustice, and the blind passion”86 characteristic of any great and 
memorable historical event, it renders the event incapable of inspiring similar acts of 
courage, valor, honor, and selflessness and, indeed, all other human accomplishments 
possible only in the womb of the unhistorical.      
 Nietzsche’s analysis of man’s relation to his history and of the burgeoning historical 
culture of his own nineteenth century Germany evidences the profound realization of a basic 
conflict within the soul of man: the demand for truth versus the necessity of illusion.  
Nietzsche puts the problem succinctly in a set of early notes when he writes,  
 
 
                                                
fact proves to be the sole inhibition to his eventual action.  That he acts so lethargically upon learning 
the demands of his father’s ghost and stages a play to establish his uncle Claudius as his father’s 
murderer only evidences his knowledge that revenge is as an illusory goal in an incorrigibly unjust 
world.  By contrast, Laertes, who sets out immediately to avenge his own father’s death, embodies the 
unhistorical sense; his unwavering trust in familial obligation pushes him onward.  See Nietzsche, 
The Birth of Tragedy, in The Birth of Tragedy and the Case of Wagner, trans. Walter Kaufmann (New 
York: Vintage Books, 1967), 7, 60. 
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There can be neither society nor culture without untruth.  The tragic conflict.  
Everything which is good and beautiful depends upon illusion: truth kills—it 
even kills itself (insofar as it realizes that error is its foundation).87   
 
If history is to remain in the service of life rather than truth, history itself must remain in the 
service of “an unhistorical power, and, thus subordinate.”88  Only a kind of thinking that 
could begin to call into the question the value of history for life in the first place would be 
adequate to the task.  Elsewhere, Nietzsche makes it clear that only philosophical thinking is 
adequate to master the knowledge drive and therefore be of any positive significance for 
culture,89 because science depends on philosophy for all of its goals and methods.90  Quoting 
Nietzsche again, 
If we are ever to achieve a culture, unheard-of artistic powers will be needed 
in order to break the unlimited knowledge drive, in order to produce unity 
once again.  Philosophy reveals its highest worth when it concentrates the 
unlimited knowledge drive and subdues it to unity.91 
 
Confident that both the historical and the unhistorical senses are equally necessary for the 
health of a man, a people, or a culture, and that an excess of the historical hinders individual 
action and destroys genuine culture, Nietzsche condemns nearly all human beings to an ideal 
of freedom to choose ends only while claiming external, metaphysical validity for them.  Put 
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simply, he denies the possibility of an ironic politics. One of the foremost contemporary 
advocates of an ironic approach to politics, Richard Rorty has asserted that citizens of the 
ideal community would dedicate themselves to a “postmodernist bourgeois” form of 
liberalism loyal to morality while devoid of any feigned, ex post facto “discoveries” of 
supposed metaphysical underpinnings.  Nietzsche, however, contends that human beings 
require such ultimate foundations in order to avoid slipping into existential despair over the 
meaninglessness of life.  Isaiah Berlin provides a summary critique of this view of the nature 
of human striving and moral virtue when he writes, 
It may be that the ideal of freedom to choose ends without claiming external 
validity for them, and the pluralism of values connected with this, is only the late fruit 
of our declining capitalist civilization: an ideal which remote ages and primitive 
societies have not recognized, and one which posterity will regard with curiosity, 
even sympathy, but little comprehension.  This may be so; but no skeptical 
conclusions seem to me to follow.  Principles are not less sacred because their 
duration cannot be guaranteed.  Indeed, the very desire for guarantees that our values 
are eternal and secure in some objective heaven is perhaps only a craving for the 
certainties of childhood or the absolute values of our primitive past. ‘To realize the 
relative validity of one’s convictions’, said an admirable writer of our time, ‘and yet 
stand for them unflinchingly, is what distinguishes a civilized man from a barbarian.’  
To demand more than this is perhaps a deep and incurable metaphysical need; but to 
allow it to determine one’s practice is a symptom of an equally deep, and more 
dangerous, moral and political immaturity.92 
 
Interestingly, Nietzsche and Berlin agree on the human desire to guarantee the 
validity of values.  However, whereas Berlin takes a page from Freud’s book to ridicule the 
desire (i.e., the wish) as patently infantile, Nietzsche takes the desire seriously as the 
philosophical, human longing for permanence, for Being.  Indeed, only insofar as a man has 
developed a psychological immunity to the brute indifference of the universe can he be 
regarded as truly healthy and mature.  By contrast, nineteenth century German historians 
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Essays, eds. Henry Hardy and Roger Hausheer (New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 1997), 242, 
(emphasis mine). 
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continue to pollute the culture with knowledge that gives people reason to question the 
validity of their values.  Nietzsche clearly thinks their efforts pernicious, and spends much of 
the remainder of his essay lamenting the remarkable degree of disunity that characterized the 
German culture of which he was still not an influential part. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 5 
 
THE CONSEQUENCES OF HISTORICAL EDUCATION 
 FOR LIFE AND PHILOSOPHY 
 
 
Our historical education is heading for the death of all culture.  It enters into 
battle against religions and incidentally destroys cultures.93 
 
 
 Arguably the most important sections of the second Untimely Meditation are the ones 
that have been heretofore largely ignored: those that contain Nietzsche’s extended account of 
the various manifestations of historicism in virtually all aspects of German culture.  In these 
sections he not only addresses the changes in personality and psychology of people who are 
overwhelmed with knowledge of history, he also explains how academic study is made worse 
by history having become a scientific discipline.  Its effects are felt in areas as wide ranging 
as fashion and academic philosophy. 
That Nietzsche dedicates so much of his essay to an inventory of the symptoms 
associated with an excess of historical knowledge evidences his desire that his obtuse 
contemporaries “at least recognize that [they] are suffering from [a consuming fever of 
history].”94  He intends this truth first and foremost for Germany’s youth.  In contrast to 
Plato’s Socrates, who “considered it necessary that the first generation of his new society (in 
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the perfect state) should be educated with the aid of a mighty necessary lie,”95 Nietzsche 
deems it necessary for his first generation to confront a necessary truth: “that the German 
possesses no culture because his education provides no basis for one.”96  Modern man is not 
educated to culture; rather, he is “historically educated”97 about cultures.  The modern 
university no longer produces cultured human beings; rather, it produces philistines.  With no 
reason to believe that his culture will be the last to suffer from this educational defect, 
Nietzsche vividly describes the ravaging effects of historical knowledge on his own 
nineteenth century Germany not only for the benefit of his time, but also “for the benefit of a 
time to come,”98 in the hopes that the philosophers of the future will recognize similarly the 
negative roles history can play and take action to moderate the historical and scientific 
excesses of their cultures. 
 
The Relationship Between History and Culture 
 According to Nietzsche, the practice of history as a scholarly discipline upsets “the 
natural relationship of an age, a culture, a nation with its history.”99  The genuine historian 
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93-94. 
 
96 Nietzsche, On the Uses and Disadvantages of History for Life, 10.4, 119. 
 
97 Nietzsche, On the Uses and Disadvantages of History for Life, 4.3,  79. 
 
98 Nietzsche, On the Uses and Disadvantages of History for Life, Foreword, 60.   
 
99 Nietzsche, On the Uses and Disadvantages of History for Life, 4.1, 77. 
 42 
remains attentive to his culture’s hunger for his historical knowledge but accommodates his 
published work to a culture’s true needs and its inherent capacity to incorporate knowledge 
of the past and foreign.  The historians Nietzsche criticizes observe none of these natural 
limitations.  Their motto is “fiat, veritas, pereat vita”—let the truth prevail, though life 
perish.100  Committed to truth at any price, they engage in demythologizing strategies that 
explain away the irrational elements of a culture’s heritage without the proper respect for the 
actual psychological needs of man that account for their genesis and justify their continued 
existence.101  They gorge themselves with history, accumulating facts and judging them only 
by the degree of certainty with which they can be verified.  Because of this they seek 
“smaller and smaller objects” to study; they proclaim, “what is small shall be eternal, 
because it is knowable.”102  On the basis of these barbarian biases, the concept of historian 
dissolves “into mere curiosity and the pretense of knowing everything.”103  They are 
captivated by objects of knowledge when they ought to be concerned with the possible uses 
of knowledge for the betterment of culture. 
 Nineteenth century historians succeed all too well in accommodating historical 
research to the demands of scientific methodology, and their findings prove no less 
disconcerting than those of the natural scientists having preceded them.  In order to dramatize 
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the importance of the discovery of scientific history, Nietzsche draws out implicitly the 
comparison with two other great intellectual shifts in human history.  Early in the 
seventeenth century, the astronomer Galileo Galilei published an essay reporting his 
discovery of four moons orbiting the planet Jupiter, thus undermining the geocentric theory 
of the universe that had long established earth as the center on the basis of its own satellite.  
In the mid-nineteenth century, the biologist Charles Darwin published On the Origin of 
Species by Means of Natural Selection, suggesting that man was nothing more than a highly 
complex organism having evolved from simpler forms through the operation of natural 
causes, thus undermining the notion of a great chain of being that differentiated man from the 
animals on the basis of their place in an eternal hierarchy.   For well over two millennia man 
was content to believe that God had placed the Garden of Eden at the center of the universe, 
and that He had created man in His own image to inhabit that paradise.  The natural 
scientists, preferring scientific liberation to theological dogma, hastened childhood’s end for 
man, burdening him with the knowledge that he inhabited instead a cold, indifferent universe.  
Man, they discovered, was no absolute; the stability of his values, indeed, the existence of his 
very species, was not guaranteed.  If the natural scientists alienate man from his world by 
portraying the universe as a self-contained mechanism of matter in motion, devoid of 
purpose, the scientific historians alienate man from his culture by making accessible every 
other form and way of life of the past, in abundant detail.  Previously man was content to 
pass moral judgment and discharge his obligations within the confines of a delimited horizon 
formed by his cultural tradition.  The historians, preferring the proliferation of knowledge to 
the preservation of culture, burden man with the knowledge that he inhabits an ambivalent 
world marked by a plurality of possible perspectives on the good and the right.  Culture, he 
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recognizes, is mere horizon; the validity of his values, indeed, the worthiness of his own 
cultural tradition, is subject to interrogation.  
 Because historians do not observe Nietzsche’s dictum that the demands of life ought 
to “reign and exercise constraint on knowledge of the past,”104 they allow historical 
knowledge to stream in “unceasingly from inexhaustible wells.”105  While man attempts to 
open the gates of his memory wide enough to accommodate the vast expanse of knowledge 
to which he is now privy, he simply cannot make room for all of these “strange guests.”106 
Although he does his best to welcome, sort out, and seat his company, he cannot prevent 
them from coming into conflict with one another; he suspects that he will have to subdue all 
of them lest he, too, perish in their struggle.  In time, accustoming himself to this boisterous 
household “becomes a second nature, though this second nature is beyond question much 
weaker, much more restless, and thoroughly less sound than the first.”107   Nietzsche thus 
analogizes man’s psyche to a quarrelsome household in which the alien houseguests 
represent various cultural traditions all vying for supremacy.  While he wishes to tolerate 
each of them, he cannot help but recognize that cultures distinguish themselves by more than 
their superficial and cosmetic differences—clothing, cuisine, and table manners.  Cultures are 
vastly disparate and incommensurable with regard to the governmental principles, citizen 
obligations, religious practices, artistic styles, class conscriptions, wealth distribution, race 
relations, and gender roles; in short, different cultures embody different assumptions about 
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justice and the good life.  When conflicting cultural traditions make competing claims to 
man’s allegiance, he can either affirm one cultural practice as superior to another and act 
accordingly with confidence in his judgment, or he can remain ambivalent as to the virtue of 
either practice and act carelessly—if he acts at all—without faith in himself.  Too often, 
regrettably, modern men lack the courage of their convictions (if they have any at all); their 
greater capacity for reflection, comparison, and analysis culminates in paralysis. 
Nietzsche asserts that his contemporaries’ regrettable tendency to drag around with 
them “huge [quantities] of indigestible stones of knowledge”108 betrays “the most 
characteristic quality of modern man: the remarkable antithesis between an interior which 
fails to correspond to any exterior and an exterior which fails to correspond to any 
interior.”109 The acquisition of knowledge, as Goethe makes explicit in the quotation 
introducing Nietzsche’s essay, ought to result in either the commencement of new action or 
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stones lead to the demise of a mischievous wolf in the Grimm’s Fairy Tale, “The Wolf and the Seven 
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pull him over the edge and drown him. 
 Although the details of this particular story reveal nothing of any esoteric importance, the 
Grimm Brothers’ attempt to bolster pride in the German folk tradition through their scholarly and 
literary contributions probably did not go unnoticed by Nietzsche.  His decision to allude to one of 
their fairy tales may embody a subtle tribute to what the translator of a recent edition of the brothers’ 
work describes as their wish to “preserve, contain, and present to the German public what they felt 
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such rich, natural culture.”  See Jacob Grimm and Wilhelm Grimm, “The Wolf and the Seven Young 
Kids,” in The Complete Fair Tales of the Brothers Grimm, trans. Jack Zipes (New York: Bantam 
Books, 2003), xxx,18-20. 
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the enlivening of energetic activity already in progress; it functions properly as “an agent for 
transforming the outside world.”110  Modern man, however, is so single-minded in his 
acquisition of knowledge that he never bothers to consider either the amenability of its 
application or the desirability of its consequences for culture.  He familiarizes himself with 
the various eras of history along with the myriad overarching worldviews distinctive of 
common cultures; he takes note of the diverse social, political, legal, economic, military, 
religious, aesthetic, and technological elements of past societies.  But he fails to incorporate 
his newfound knowledge of past cultures in any meaningful way in his own culture; the best 
his knowledge can approximate is “an idea of and feeling for culture” from which no true 
cultural achievement can emerge.111  Modern man proves more adroit at acquiring historical 
knowledge than any of his predecessors, but inasmuch as he over-cultivates this virtue at the 
expense of others, he renders himself completely inexpert at exercising knowledge in the 
service of life and the advancement of culture.  Confronted by the disparate moral and ethical 
imperatives of alien cultures, he questions his own fitness to adjudicate the quarrel and 
doubts his own culture’s adequacy to serve as any authority.  Ironically, “modern man 
describes with a curious pride” this “chaotic inner world” of conflicting concerns and 
loyalties as “his uniquely characteristic inwardness.”112  What Nietzsche understands as 
evidence of typically weak-souled men, his contemporaries attempt to pass off as profound 
introspection and, in doing so, confuse knowledge of culture with the thing in itself.  
Nietzsche registers his disgust with the current state of affairs by comparing man’s 
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relationship with knowledge to a gastro-intestinal affliction: that he ceaselessly consumes 
knowledge of the past without a hunger for it and contrary to his own needs for a healthy life 
puts him at risk of perishing of indigestion.  Like a snake that swallows the knowledge of 
other cultures whole, he fattens himself to satiety, “lies in the sun and avoids all unnecessary 
movement.”113   
 
The Greek Disposition Towards History 
 Although Nietzsche considers this pretentious inwardness to which nothing outward 
corresponds a fundamental characteristic of German culture altogether “unknown to the 
peoples of earlier times,”114 he does not think his contemporary Germans the only people to 
have ever been threatened by “the danger of being overwhelmed by what was past and 
foreign, of perishing through ‘history’.”115  Just as present German culture and religion 
amounts to an inwardly warring chaos of all foreign countries and past ages, the Greek 
culture of antiquity was “for a long time a chaos of foreign, Semitic, Babylonian, Lydian, 
[and] Egyptian forms and ideas, and their religion [was] truly a battle of all the gods of the 
East.”116  The Greeks, however, “gradually learned to organize the chaos” by distinguishing 
their true needs from the false ones and following the Delphic oracle’s famous decree: 
“Know yourself.”117  The Greeks, no less than the Germans, “possessed…an inherently 
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insatiable thirst for knowledge,” but they “controlled it by their ideal need for and 
consideration of all the values of life.”118  Rather than merely acquaint themselves with the 
knowledge of other living cultures for the sake of “learned pedantry”119 they absorbed the 
experiences of other cultures in order to live them through, to put foreign wisdom into 
practice.  They took elements of philosophy and science from their neighbors only to fulfill, 
enhance, and elevate those elements and thereby raise themselves above their neighbors.  As 
the greatest discoverers, voyagers, and colonizers in history, they knew first and foremost 
how to learn in the truest sense, to properly assimilate and appropriate every gain in 
knowledge with a view toward the elevation of human life and the preservation of cultural 
identity.  Were one of these archaic Greeks suddenly marooned in the modern world, 
Nietzsche imagines, he would surely regard the Germans as “walking encyclopedias”120 
devoid of any real culture to call their own; insofar as they try to pass off inward 
thoughtfulness and study of culture as culture itself, the text on the cover of this haphazardly 
thrown together and loosely bound cultural scrapbook must certainly read “Handbook of 
inward culture for outward barbarians.”121 
 In contrast to the Greeks, who stubbornly preserved their unhistorical sense during 
the period of their greatest vigor, the Germans protect themselves from being overwhelmed 
by history by avoiding taking knowledge of the past and foreign too seriously; from this, 
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Nietzsche notes, arises the “weak personality”122 that bears the weight of history only by 
accepting the contributions of other cultures as superficially as possible so that it might easily 
dispose of and reject them at will.  Perpetually inattentive to even the smallest of cultural 
demands as demands, man becomes ever more lazy and self-indulgent.  The inner man 
becomes increasingly disconnected from the outside world and “finally widens the dubious 
gulf between content and form to the point of complete insensibility to barbarism.”123  
Nietzsche defines barbarism negatively in relation to true culture as the marked disunity of 
artistic style in all the vital manifestations of a people whose individual personalities are 
wretchedly fragmented into inward and outward, or content and form.124  His definition 
prefigures the postmodern erasure of all boundaries.         
 The disposition to no longer take things seriously manifests itself most immediately 
in a man’s physical appearance—in his mode of walking, standing, speaking, dressing, 
dwelling and the like.  Nietzsche remarks that one need only wander through a German city 
and observe his contemporaries for a day to assure himself that his fellow Germans are 
suffering from a weakened personality.  Once they had painstakingly sought to, and often 
succeeded at imitating the conventions of the French school; now they follow their own 
inclinations wherever they lead, adopting the precepts of other schools sloppily and 
indiscriminately.  Nietzsche explains that the decision to abandon the French tradition rests 
on a revaluation of convention as such.  The conventions that once unified German etiquette 
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and dress are now regarded as fictions, as “vestments and disguises”125 that while not exactly 
hated, are certainly feared.  Because of the historical education that has made him a “strolling 
spectator” in a “cosmopolitan carnival of gods, arts, and customs,”126 he recognizes cultural 
conventions as mere conventions, as customs and agreements developed and observed over 
time, representing nothing more than the dominate will of a majority of the people in any 
particular society.  He has no specific disdain for French civilization and refinement; rather, 
he thinks himself without reason to keep the covenants of any culture.  While he professes 
outwardly the wish to abandon the conventional in favor of the natural, and therefore more 
German, he desires inwardly only what is easy and comfortable.  The prevalent passion for 
ease and comfort manifests itself in every stylistic convention adopted by the German people, 
from their boorish manners to their gaudy art and architecture.  Everything in Germany, 
Nietzsche laments, is “colourless, worn out, badly copied, [and] negligent.”127  Clothing 
requiring no ingenuity whatsoever to produce—because its design is “borrowed from 
abroad”128 and copied with extreme sloppiness—comes as close as anything else to a genuine 
contribution to German fashion. 
 
The Consequences of Scientific History for the University  
Nietzsche faults the modern university for its preparation of a continual world’s fair 
in which man can wander around aimlessly and enjoy himself.  Professional historians 
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assemble for public exhibition the customs, ages, arts, and religions of alien cultures, their 
wars and revolutions, but as circus attractions they make no deep impressions.  Philosophy, 
“the most truthful of all sciences,”129 according to Nietzsche, loses its rightful place at the top 
of the hierarchy of disciplines and becomes a subject of universal education as well, and as 
such it is reduced to an “unnatural, artificial…and unworthy state.”130  Philosophy began out 
of genuine human curiosity and wonder about the nature and origins of the universe, the 
meaning of human life and conduct, and the ultimate destiny of man.  Its practitioners—
Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle, among others—posed questions with practical concerns and 
offered answers with direct implications for everyday life.  Inasmuch as the Greeks attempted 
to answer the question of what sort of life is best and how one ought to live, philosophy itself 
was no mere theoretical discipline bereft of practical application; it existed as a 
comprehensive way of living and dying.  Theory and practice necessarily affected one 
another.  Moreover, the sheer effort in private thought and public discourse required to amass 
philosophical views in any great number evidenced a peculiar sort of character.  Put 
economically, the philosophic life had opportunity costs: its initiates were few and far 
between because both the sizeable intellectual prowess and the abundance of leisure time 
required for philosophy were rare.   
With the advent of professional philosophy in German universities, however, 
professors “write, speak, and teach” the philosophy of past ages, but none “dares to venture 
to fulfill the philosophical law in himself.”131  That is, such a professor amasses enough 
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historical knowledge to report accurately that Plato’s Socrates famously equates knowledge 
with virtue, that Aristotle argues that the philosophic life is the best life a human can lead, 
that Epicurus demonstrates the groundlessness of the fear of death and divine retribution, that 
Epictetus teaches that wise individuals limit their desires to matters within their control, and 
so on, but he does not take any of these teachings seriously enough to begin the life-long 
process of testing their respective wisdom.  He does not live philosophically, evaluating these 
philosophies on the basis of his own experience.  Instead, professors teach the great books of 
philosophy and the lives of the great philosophers as the history of ideas and historical 
biography, seemingly oblivious to fact that for every philosophical genius before him history 
was no more than a technique, a repository of evidence drawn upon only to supplement an 
argument of greater importance.  The scholarship these philosophical historians produce 
amounts to no more than a tired sigh of “if only,” a gesture at what “there once was.”132  
Students, likewise, assume virtually none of the opportunity costs previously associated with 
the philosophic life, amassing just enough knowledge to engage in idle banter.  The 
remaining contributions to philosophy outside of historical scholarship are “political and 
official, limited by governments, churches, academies,” and other censors.  What once 
existed as a disinterested search for truth, for the principles of the good society and the good 
life, now exists as mere ideology, as a rationalization for current or future political and social 
arrangements construed by parties with definite interests.  Recognizing that scholarship 
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about, and criticism of philosophy has all but completely replaced the thing itself, Nietzsche 
asks despairingly, “Are there still human beings…or perhaps only thinking-, writing- and 
speaking-machines?”133 
 One suspects that Nietzsche is ready to answer “No” when he describes the rage for 
criticism in academic scholarship.  Whenever something arguably good and just happens, 
whether its product is some action, a work of philosophy, a collection of stories, a piece of 
poetry, or a page of music, the modern observer ignores the work entirely and focuses his 
attention on the author’s biography.134  The character of the author, his life story, and the 
historical conditions surrounding the work’s production become the subject of interest at the 
work’s expense.  If the work is one amongst many, the scientific compulsion in the observer 
takes over.  He does his best to classify and order the work according to its author’s past 
development and the putative course of his future development; he compares the author’s 
work to that of other writers and analyzes, dissects, and reassembles it before generally 
chastising and reprimanding the author for the supposed flaws inherent within.  Even though 
these same scholars will not produce a work of comparable quality in their lifetime, they 
deem themselves fit to criticize the intellectual and artistic contributions of others.  The work 
itself never produces an effect because no one gives serious consideration to its substance; 
thought results in no action outside of the requisite critique, which itself can beget only 
another critique.  Cultural contributions are no longer judged morally as noble or ignoble, 
just or unjust, beautiful or vulgar on the basis of their effects on the lives of human beings, 
but simply as successful or unsuccessful on the basis of the attention they garner and the 
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number of critiques they warrant.    People chatter a while about the latest novelty, but at 
bottom nothing changes; “they go on doing what they have always done.”135 
Much as Plato argues that the disintegration of the constitution of a state induces a 
corresponding degeneration within the souls of its citizenry, Nietzsche contends that the 
erosion of German high culture and national tradition enfeebles the moral sense of the 
German people and fractures their personalities.  The historians allow “access to the 
labyrinths of unfinished cultures and to every semi-barbarism that ever existed on earth,” and 
in doing so engender “the sense and instinct for everything, the taste and tongue for 
everything—which immediately proves itself to be an ignoble sense.”136  That is, the 
democratization of history itself as a form of inquiry results in a culture that is more 
democratic in its inclinations and therefore more base.  Every German city regardless of 
locale becomes, in effect, its own Piraeus—a multicultural port city inhabited by foreigners 
and decadents.  Its citizens freely and enthusiastically succumb to a succession of intellectual 
and social fads and fashions, wandering from one distraction to the next.  They privilege no 
one cultural heritage over another and try on new pieces of prehistory as if they were 
costumes designed to entertain.137  Lacking a basic sense of shared values, the German 
                                                
135 Nietzsche, On the Uses and Disadvantages of History for Life, 5.5, 87. 
 
136 Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, 224, 151. 
 
137 See Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, 223, 150: “The hybrid European—all in all, a tolerably 
ugly plebian—simply needs a costume: he requires history as a storage room for costumes.  To be 
sure, he soon notices that not one fits him very well;  so he keeps changing.  Let anyone look at the 
nineteenth century with an eye for these quick preferences and changes of the style masquerade; also 
for the moments of despair over the fact that “nothing is becoming.”  It is no use to parade as 
romantic or classical, Christian or Florentine, baroque or “national,” in moribus et artibus: it ‘does 
not look good.’  But the ‘spirit,’ especially the ‘historical spirit,’ finds its advantage even in this 
despair: again and again a new piece of prehistory or a foreign country is tried on, put on, taken off, 
packed away, and above all studied: we are the first age that has truly studies ‘costumes’—I mean 
those moralities, articles of faith, tastes in the arts, and religions—prepared like no previous age for a 
 55 
people glut their lives with petty pleasures and go their own way as atomized individuals, 
ever distrustful of authority and resistant to the demands of true culture.  Nietzsche imagines 
that the typical German, like Plato’s democratic man, 
lives along day by day, gratifying the desire that occurs to him, at one time 
drinking and listening to the flute, at another downing water and reducing; 
now practicing gymnastic, and again idling and neglecting everything; and 
sometimes spending his time as though he were occupied with philosophy.  
Often he engages in politics and, jumping up, says and does whatever chances 
to come to him; and if he admires any soldiers, he turns in that direction; and 
if it’s monkey-makers, in that one.  And there is neither order nor necessity in 
his life, but calling this life sweet, free, and blessed he follows it 
throughout.138 
 
Of course, that this democratic man occasionally dons the costumes of the flutist, the 
gymnast, the philosopher, the politician, the soldier, and the merchant only evidences the 
limitations of democratic culture.  Although democracies generally allow citizens free reign 
to satisfy their fickle desires, they can never provide the kind of cultural nourishment men 
need to achieve a higher standard of health and maturity.  Insofar as history is practiced 
democratically, it in fact produces injustice and disorder in the soul of man.  Because 
historians are “attached to the law of equality,”139 and confuse a lack of sound judgment for 
objectivity, Nietzsche questions the claim to justice made by his fellow German academics.  
In doing so, he offers a remarkable critique of the notion of “objective” history and, in takes 
needed steps toward offering a new account of what history should ultimately be about. 
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CHAPTER 6 
 
THE TRUE PURPOSE OF HISTORY 
 
 
The researchers of many eminent antiquarians have already thrown much 
darkness on the subject; and it is possible, if they continue their labors, that 
we shall soon know nothing at all. 
         Artemus Ward 
 
The main work of the historian is not to record, but to evaluate; for if he does 
not evaluate, how can he know what is worth recording? 
            Edward Harlett Carr 
 
 
 For most of the second Untimely Meditation, Nietzsche appears to take it for granted 
that objective historical knowledge is possible.  Indeed, it is the ability of scientifically 
minded historians to expose the lowly human, all too human origins of many of Germany’s 
most cherished cultural and religious traditions that compels Nietzsche to write his polemic 
against this newly emergent form of history.  In section six, however, he appears to reverse 
his position entirely.  Instead of criticizing German historians for the consequences of the 
successful practice of scientific history, he lambastes them for failing to realize that objective 
history is a chimerical, unrealizable ideal.  Is Nietzsche simply confused here?  If not, what 
purpose does he serve by making these seemingly irreconcilable arguments?  I contend that 
Nietzsche’s criticisms of the idea of objective history—many of which anticipate aptly the 
postmodern critique of history—are best understood as rhetorical and instrumental in nature.  
While he does not abandon his conviction that there are clear and unambiguous historical 
facts that we can all know, he exposes the bias inherent in all historical narratives in order to 
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exploit it.  The guide for writing history that Nietzsche prescribes in his text is so necessarily 
subjective that its subjectivity must be excused first if his historiography is to persist as a 
credible alternative to the scientific practice of history.  In short, Nietzsche is willing to deny 
the power of objective history (despite the fact that he believes in it) in order to ensure its 
undoing.  He proceeds by way of a consideration of the relationship between history and 
philosophy. 
The German reduction of philosophy from the pursuit of universal law and eternal 
verities to a branch of cultural history impels Nietzsche to defend the “honest naked goddess 
philosophy”140 against the historians who deprecate her.  In section six, he demonstrates 
philosophy’s superiority to history by refuting his contemporaries’ claim that by writing 
history “objectively,” i.e., by setting forth the record of human societies as the unattested 
facts are accumulated, they earn the right to call themselves just, “and just in a higher degree 
than men of other ages.”141  Philosophy proves its worth insofar as Nietzsche’s 
counterargument is steeped in the philosophy of historiography.  Not only does he provide 
ample reasons for doubting that the course of their famous objectivity lies in an increased 
need and longing for justice, he also denies that objectivity in their sense is either achievable 
or desirable.  Historians ought not strive merely for a correspondence between what actually 
happened in the past and their narrative account of the who, what, when, where, and why—
an impossible goal, in any case.  Genuine historians are judges, not accountants; they 
recognize that the devotion to fact must be subordinate to the willingness to pass judgment 
on the past in order to ennoble the present.  The nineteenth century German historians 
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Nietzsche criticizes not only fail to understand the true relationship between history and 
culture, but also refuse to acknowledge the epistemological limitations of their own 
discipline.  Realizing what history can only be insofar as knowledge of the past and foreign is 
concerned, Nietzsche reminds his audience of what history could be were it written by 
philosopher-poets like Herodotus and Plutarch and not university scholars.  The latter suffer a 
grave misfortune when they assume that they possess the virtue of justice when they in fact 
do not, unwittingly causing great harm to both themselves and the culture of which they are 
an influential part. 
 Nietzsche begins his interrogation of the German historians with a consideration of 
perhaps the weightiest issue in the entire essay: the nature of justice.  In the nineteenth 
century, many intelligent thinkers attempted to provide a satisfactory conception of the 
elusive concept of justice.  Jeremy Bentham, for example, sought to provide the ways and 
means for maximizing the happiness of society at large, arguing that justice is served when 
the greatest good for the greatest number is the adoptive ruling principle.  Karl Marx, by 
contrast, attempted to demonstrate the scientific validity of his socialist doctrine, contending 
that justice can only be realized when the alienated industrial working class triumphs over the 
privileged bourgeoisie and administrates to each according to his needs.  Nietzsche, however, 
does not understand justice in terms of its modern social applications; that is, it has nothing 
to do primarily with incomes, status, social conditions, property, and other distributable 
goods and intangibles.  Rather, Nietzsche understands justice as a particular trait of 
exceptional individuals, as a political virtue that unites “the highest and rarest virtues.”142  
Just as Plato and Aristotle argued before him, Nietzsche maintains that justice involves the 
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strength to render to each person what is their due.  In the present context, the just historian 
gives the past its due by seeking the right kind of knowledge with the right intentions and the 
strength to benefit humanity.  The just man does not seek “cold, ineffectual knowledge”143 
merely to satisfy his curiosity, to stave off boredom, or to amuse himself.  Instead, he seeks 
knowledge as a “regulating and punishing judge,”144 as a delimiter of human horizons and 
the boundaries of good and evil.  He “sets him[self] on a solitary height as the most 
venerable exemplar of the species”145 because his task is the most difficult for a man: he 
must summon the will to act even though as a wanderer through the halls of history the “lines 
of his horizon are restlessly changing.”146  While others become sick and collapse without a 
narrow horizon, the just man endures the widest horizons, yet still manages to legislate truth 
for an entire culture.  Confronted by the arts, customs, religions, and philosophies of past 
ages, he judges confidently, pronouncing his verdicts on past and foreign practices neither 
harshly nor sorrowfully; if ever he questions the justice of his decisions, he tries to overcome 
the initial doubt and achieve certainty as to the usefulness of a particular element of history 
for the advancement of present culture.  Nietzsche recognizes that magnanimity, too, is a 
virtue in its own right.  But much as the just man cannot always afford to be generally 
generous and forgiving, the genuine historian must escape the tendency to tolerate the past 
and foreign and muster the courage to judge it, to give history its due with the proper 
consideration of true individual and cultural needs.  Given these tall requirements, the just 
                                                
143 Nietzsche, On the Uses and Disadvantages of History for Life, 6.2, 88. 
 
144 Nietzsche, On the Uses and Disadvantages of History for Life, 6.2, 88. 
  
145 Nietzsche, On the Uses and Disadvantages of History for Life, 6.2, 88. 
  
146 Nietzsche, On the Uses and Disadvantages of History for Life, 1.5, 63. 
 
 60 
man is indeed rare, and too often men are lacking in either the will or the capacity to be just.  
Especially harmful to humankind throughout history are those under the illusion that they 
have been called to legislate, when in fact they lack all ability to judge and discern justice 
truly.  More often, however, men take upon themselves the task of seeking knowledge of no 
consequence and proclaiming indifferent truths; insofar as entire regiments of researchers 
dedicate themselves to the acquisition of knowledge that requires no strength to attain and 
eventuates in nothing, they fall far short of the demands of justice as Nietzsche describes 
them. 
The university historians who pride themselves on their objectivity presume that to 
give the past its due, the historian must maintain a neutral stance towards all individuals, 
events, and ideas of the past, uninfluenced by emotion or personal prejudice.  For Nietzsche, 
however, the claim to objectivity usually warrants the claimant’s classification among one of 
the three species of wretched historian.  The first type of historian reports the facts of history 
that are widely agreed upon and practically indisputable; he describes what happened in the 
past and explains why certain events happened as they did (or at all).  In doing so, however, 
he accords equal treatment to all that is past and foreign, thereby lessening the seriousness of 
certain ideas and events that deserve a more careful exposition and judgmental tone if 
knowledge of them is to be introduced into German culture.  His disinclination to judge 
betrays a weak soul seeking exemption from the duty to discriminate between the noble and 
the base, the beneficial and injurious.  Yet his defects remain hidden—if not celebrated 
outright—inasmuch as the ignorant and “inexperienced,” routinely mistake the “mere 
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absence of abrasiveness and harsh condemnation of the past” for “evidence of a just 
disposition.”147  That is to say, the people mistake universal tolerance for justice.   
The second type of historian, by contrast, selectively reports the facts of history as 
they suit his purpose—if he injects the factual into his work at all.  He practices history only 
as an egoist or a partisan, employing the “air of objectivity”148 duplicitously with the 
knowledge that the ignorant and inexperienced are prone to take as fact what is reported 
soberly with a host of seemingly supportive arguments, anecdotes, figures, and statistics.  He 
has a stake in political arrangements and judges only to justify a present or future system of 
power in society; his history borders on ideology, and the people mistake his rationalizations 
and distortions for the truth.   
The third type of historian judges as well, but as Nietzsche notes, “all of [his] verdicts 
are false.”149  This is because he writes history “in the naïve belief that all of the popular 
views of precisely [his] own age are the right and just views and that to write in accord with 
the view of the age is the same thing as being just.”150  While Nietzsche thinks the second 
type of historian a crude abomination, he expresses the most disdain for the third type 
because this historian is so narrow-minded as to be religious in his thinking.  Nietzsche does 
not criticize him for having a narrow horizon as such; rather, he thinks that the beliefs that 
constitute this historian’s horizon are too dependent upon contemporary community 
standards and vulgar, popular taste for him to serve as a cultural legislator.  Ironically, 
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Nietzsche notes, this historian regards as “subjective”151 all historical judgment that has not 
been adapted to the triviality of the present. 
 Nietzsche identifies as the scourge of modern historical scholarship the failure to 
realize that objectivity is an illusory goal having nothing whatsoever to do with justice.152  
The sincerest of these historians consider their defining task to be the search for truth, but 
even they fail to question whether, or what kind of truth is actually achievable.  Insofar as 
they claim their account of history to be objective, they assume not only that the past exists 
independently of what anyone thinks about it, but also that they can achieve a 
correspondence between what “really happened” in the past and their account of it.  
Nietzsche thinks that this attempt at historical realism is both dangerously naïve and ignorant 
of the reality of historical method.  As a philologist, translating and studying ancient texts 
that are themselves compilations of fragments of conflicting evidence derived from countless 
sources, he understands all too well the dream of recovering the chimerical original text.  
The historical facts that historians seek are analogous to these original texts inasmuch as the 
events of the past are forever inaccessible for purposes of reference.  Unlike the natural 
scientists, who enjoy unfettered access to the natural world to test their theories, the 
historians can never observe the actions of people involved in historical events to determine 
whether their account matches the reality of history; while they do their best to imitate the 
scientific method, time denies them the luxury of experimentation.  What history amounts to, 
then, is an unavoidably incomplete and relative account of the past, reliant upon the 
observations and memories included in the accounts of others, all of whom selected, 
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interpreted, and recorded the facts from their particular perspective.  History is necessarily 
less than the past and different from it in innumerable, unknowable ways.  And because the 
modern historians relate what they take to be the bare facts of history employing the most 
neutral, value-free language possible—operating on the assumption that the “driest phrase is 
the right phrase,”153—their histories invoke none of the original emotions that surrounded the 
lives of merciless tyrants, great statesmen, revolutionary heroes, and artistic geniuses.  The 
historian’s attempt at a carbon copy is so far from the original in both form and content that 
Nietzsche remarks, “it is as though the ‘Eroica’ Symphony had been arranged for two flutes 
for the entertainment of drowsy opium smokers.”154   
The historian can no more achieve neutral detachment from his account of history 
than a “stormy landscape with thunder and lightning”155 or an angry sea can sketch, paint, or 
photograph itself.  The painter who wishes to cover his canvas with the images of the night 
sky cannot help but introduce his own subjectivity into his work, inasmuch as he remains a 
conscious intermediary between the coarse material and the blunt, empirical reality of nature.  
So long as his goal is literal correspondence to an independently real world, he will 
ceaselessly fail to attain it.  Citing this extreme example, Nietzsche means to undermine the 
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notion of objectivity entirely, thereby making the subjectivity of the historian’s work all the 
more obvious.156  After all, anything that undergoes change has a history to be recorded; in 
the widest sense, history includes not merely all of the phenomena of human life, but all 
those of the natural world as well.  The historian unavoidably imposes his own subjectivity 
upon his work by allocating significance.  That is, he determines what the defining moments 
of history are and what people, places, events, and periods warrant inclusion in his account of  
the past.  Consequently, certain perspectives are marginalized.  In order to give his narrative 
the semblance of coherence, he “unites things when god alone knows whether they belong 
together” and routinely “substitutes something comprehensible for what is 
incomprehensible.”157  He “assumes the operation of chance where a thousand little causes 
have been at work,”158 and imposes upon his comprehensive narratives a clearly discernable 
beginning, middle, and end, giving more consideration to the needs of modern readers of 
history than to the past itself.  In short, history always bears the signature of an author, 
usually in the form of its myriad deficiencies.  So far from constituting evidence of his 
justice, modern history reveals the German historian’s inability to understand history in terms 
of its actual causes and effects.  Nor does he comprehend the psychological motives of the 
people involved in historical events.  As Nietzsche quotes Franz Grillparzer, history written 
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in this manner is no more than “the way in which the spirit of man apprehends events 
impenetrable to him.”159 
 The German historians only compound the problem further by attempting to derive 
from their errant histories broad generalizations about the social and political world in the 
same way that physicists make generalizations about the natural world.  Nietzsche admits 
that in the natural sciences, generalizations are “the most important thing, inasmuch as they 
contain the laws.”160  That is, man can accept the concept of inertia at face value because it 
describes a relationship between things in the world that has always been observed to be true:  
every object in a state of uniform motion tends to remain in a state of motion unless an 
external force is applied to it.  Man does well to accept Newton’s first law of motion as 
universally true—at least until an exception is observed—because he can use it to make 
predictions about physical events and advance his understanding of the world.  The meaning 
of history and its ultimate significance for humankind, however, does not lie in its general 
ideas and propositions.  Although historical laws taking the form “whenever x occurs, y is 
bound to follow” probably exist, Nietzsche retorts, “whatever truth remains in such 
propositions after the obscurities referred to have been removed is something completely 
familiar and even trivial.”161  That is, human social behavior is so complicated that although 
recurrent, orderly, and empirically demonstrable patterns do exist, they are the stuff of 
common sense rather than curiosity.  When scientific methodology is applied to social 
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phenomena, the findings yield little of interest for either the helmsmen steering the ship of 
state or the philosopher trying to comprehend what is man.   
 The task of the genuine historian, then, is neither to set forth a record of facts about 
the past, nor to seek general propositions about human actions.  To be great and, indeed, just, 
the genuine historian “must possess the power to remint the universally known into 
something never heard of before, and to express the universal so simply and profoundly that 
the simplicity is lost in the profundity and the profundity in the simplicity.”162  True 
historians are first and foremost great artists with the creative capacity to draw the horizon 
lines that sustain a culture and direct it towards a noble future.  By virtue of their “rare 
minds”163 and their experience of great things, they are worthy to preserve and interpret “the 
great and exalted things of the past”164 for the sake of the present, attentive to man’s true 
individual and cultural needs.  The objective truth about history is of no concern to him if by 
relating it he is denied the right to judge it as noble or base.  The greatest historians—
Herodotus, Thucydides, and Plutarch among them—freely invented speeches for the figures 
in their histories, but they did so with an educative purpose; the truths these artists conveyed 
through fiction are greater than the literal truths documented by the most careful modern 
chroniclers.  If, as Nietzsche contends, the truth about history is subjective in any case, the 
choice is not between an objective history that gets at “what really happened” and a 
subjective history that is filled with omissions, exaggerations, and outright fabrications.  
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Rather, the choice is between history that serves life and advances culture and history that is 
injurious to both. 
Nietzsche’s critique of the German historical sense is as thorough and unrelenting as 
it is because he claims to understand better than his contemporaries the tenuous relationship 
between historical knowledge and cultural cohesion.  That is, Nietzsche believes that for a 
culture to remain stable and healthy, it must be able to maintain certain assumptions about 
the origins of its moral and political values and institutions. Nietzsche laments the 
impossibility of shrouding the origins of a nation or a religion in myth, given the methods 
and capabilities of this new form of historical education and research.  In the remaining 
sections of Nietzsche’s critique of German historicism, he extends his case against the whole 
of the new academic and philosophical approach to history by addressing the prospects for 
cultural progress in an age in which people are increasingly aware of their place in history. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 7 
 
HISTORY AND CULTURAL PROGRESS 
 
 
By way of comparison let us now picture the abstract man, untutored by myth; 
abstract education; abstract morality; abstract law; the abstract state; let us 
imagine the lawless roving of the artistic imagination, unchecked by any 
native myth; let us think of a culture that has no fixed and sacred primordial 
site but is doomed to exhaust all possibilities and to nourish itself wretchedly 
on all other cultures—there we have the present age, the result of that 
Socratism which is bent on the destruction of myth.  And now the mythless 
man stands eternally hungry, surrounded by all past ages, and digs and grubs 
for roots, even if he has to dig from them among the remotest antiquities.  The 
tremendous historical need of our unsatisfied modern culture, the assembling 
around one of countless other cultures, the consuming desire for knowledge—
what does all this point to, if not to the loss of myth, the loss of the mythical 
home, the mythical maternal womb?165 
 
 
 Throughout On the Uses and Disadvantages of History for Life, Nietzsche’s principal 
argument against scientific history is that its practitioners inevitably lose the capacity to 
discriminate between the great and the small, the beneficial and the injurious, the life-
preserving and the deadly. Such historians have no regard for the consequences of making 
public potentially unsettling truths about the often crude and humble origins of nations and 
religions.  In sections seven and eight of the essay, Nietzsche makes his most forceful 
arguments against German historicism by describing its consequences for both individual 
human and collective social, cultural progress.  Nietzsche believes that an overabundance of 
historical knowledge results in a disrupted instinct, a belief in the old age of mankind, and a 
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dangerous mood of irony and cynicism.  As usual, Nietzsche words his concerns cryptically 
and idiosyncratically, so they require considerable explanation. 
 
The Enfeeblement of His Instinct for Creation 
As I have already mentioned, despite Nietzsche’s contention that no amount of 
German historical scholarship can ever produce an objective, definitive account of the past, 
working historians are either unaware of, or unconvinced by the theoretical and practical 
import of his argument, for they assume that widespread agreement about a host of historical 
issues justifies their belief in objective, historical fact.  With the exception of his diversion in 
section six, Nietzsche himself takes it for granted that historical knowledge is attainable; his 
point, rather, is that value judgments are inherent to history as science inasmuch as the 
historian initially discriminates in favor of what he deems the significant issues of the past.  
If the historian cannot circumvent the necessity of making judgments about relative worth, 
then he ought to acknowledge the responsibility to consider the moral significance of the 
historical truth he promulgates.  That is, the historian cannot lay claim to justice by judging 
his history solely by the criterion of truth, exempting the facts as such from moral judgment.  
Truth itself has consequences for life and culture, neither of which ought to be subordinate to 
the perpetuation of a scholarly enterprise.   
One of the things that Nietzsche does in the second Untimely Meditation—
foreshadowing his philosophy to come—is give his readers pause to reconsider the practical 
use of truth.  “Truth,” Nietzsche declares, “makes its appearance as a social necessity.  
Afterwards, by means of a metastasis, it is applied to everything, where it is not required.”166  
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Honesty is a virtue that arises out of man’s pressing need to enter into societies with his 
fellows for the purposes of self-preservation and the elevation of human life.  It quickly 
outlives its usefulness and becomes a vice when it is misapplied, hindering both life and 
action.  Truth applied to history spreads like a disease; “it enters into battle against religions 
and incidentally destroys cultures.”167  “Historical verification always brings to light so much 
that is false, crude, inhuman, absurd, [and] violent” underlying the political, moral, and 
religious foundations of culture that man is led to discount his own cultural heritage and 
adopt a cynical attitude towards all existence.  Put even more succinctly by Nietzsche 
himself, the highest values devalue themselves.  The historian must overcome the Socratic 
intolerance for illusion inherent in his historical science if man and culture are to survive 
because “it has proven to be impossible to build a culture upon knowledge.”168  To the 
contrary, “every kind of culture begins by veiling a great number of things.  Human progress 
depends upon this veiling.”169  Because the German historians indulge their historical 
knowledge drive without restraint, they rid the world of the comprehensive, grounding 
mythologies in which man interprets his life and struggles.  They render the beautiful plain 
and transform the sacred into the profane.  If this drive to deconstruct is not paired with a 
corresponding drive to construct, “if the purpose of destroying and clearing is not to allow a 
future already alive in anticipation to raise its house on the ground thus liberated,” then 
man’s “instinct for creation will be enfeebled and discouraged.”170  Man will become so 
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accustomed to having the myths he mistakes for truth exposed as mere myths that no 
individual will emerge with the power or the creative capacity to act as a great legislator of 
truth and morality for a future culture, thereby marking man’s descent into a decadence and 
nihilism. 
 Nietzsche has his reader consider the case of what must certainly become of the 
Christian religion if it is submitted to just this kind of relentless, thoroughly historical 
treatment.  Were a couple of modern historians, these “biographers”171 as Nietzsche refers to 
them disparagingly, miraculously “transported to the birthplace of Christianity”172 and given 
free reign to indulge themselves in the actual truth of the origins of the Christian religion, the 
movement would be no more, its flame extinguished as easily as some creature of the forest 
might prevent a mighty oak from sprouting, growing, and flourishing by simply eating an 
acorn.  Jesus Christ, the Son of God, Messiah to an entire people, and spiritual messenger for 
the whole human race would be reduced, one might assume, to but one more apocalyptic 
Jewish prophet of marginal significance to history. A religion of certain origin, unveiled by 
mystery, myth, and miracle is “condemned to revolve as a star without atmosphere,”173 and 
thus has no hope of surviving.  So long as historians, archaeologists, and anthropologists 
pursue the truth of the past ignorant of, or indifferent to the consequences of their 
discoveries, the number of true believers in Western religions based on divine revelation is 
destined to dwindle.   
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Ironically, in his later works Nietzsche himself may have done as much, if not more 
than anyone in the last two hundred years to hasten Christianity’s end in the West, as books 
like his Genealogy of Morals and the Anti-Christ both go a long way toward providing a 
secular account of the origins, and popularity of Christianity, and the shift in moral codes that 
took place in the early centuries of the common era.  What distinguishes Nietzsche from his 
colleagues is, presumably, the fact that he understands and wishes the consequences of his 
actions.  While university professors debate the authorship of the Books of Moses and the 
Gospels and expose the lowly, democratic, and all too human origins of the Bible Canon at 
the Councils of Nicea and Chalcedon, Nietzsche attacks Christianity at its roots by mocking 
the kind of man it produces.   Envisioning himself in large part as a living example of the 
“critical” species of historian that he lauds early in his essay, Nietzsche sees Christianity as 
an unfortunate episode in the history of humankind that man would do well do negate.  The 
historian’s ability to expose the lowly origins of a phenomenon is important and useful, but it 
must not be applied democratically, lest even the most valuable, species-preserving and life-
affirming untruths be exposed as fallacies.   
 In describing the enfeeblement of man’s instinct for creation, Nietzsche registers his 
opinion on the whole of the Enlightenment project in general and its consequences for 
university education in particular.  Whereas Kant famously dares man to know, to use his 
own reason in order to distinguish what is universally true from what are otherwise the 
domesticating effects of poets, preachers, and politicians, Nietzsche worries that the light of 
Enlightenment was “too bright, too sudden, [and] too varying.”174  That is, despite their pure 
intentions, the torch-bearers of the Enlightenment were terribly naïve in assuming that, to 
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recall Byron’s Manfred, the tree of knowledge is indeed that of life.  The only remaining 
truth after man’s turn away from life and illusion to knowledge and truth is that all cultures 
are merely a sum of their domesticating effects, or “power-relations” in the broadest sense, as 
Michel Foucault insists.   The young university student comes to realize this as he is “swept 
along through all the millennia: youths who understand nothing of war, diplomatic action, 
commercial policy are thought fit to be introduced to political history.”175  Indeed, there is no 
history to which he is not introduced, and the result is that he “becomes so homeless and 
doubts all concepts and all customs.”176  After a short time there is nothing to which he has 
not already been exposed, nothing that could possibly surprise him, nothing that could be 
truly considered taboo.  And, to worsen matters, the universities cater first and foremost to 
the economic interests of a nation, teaching young men in the way that best suits the need of 
the current division of labor.  Science itself is consumed by an interest in profit and is 
tailored to the needs and popular desires of the public, however vulgar or contrary to the real 
needs of a healthy culture.  “No, to be so overwhelmed and bewildered by history is, as the 
ancients demonstrate, not at all necessary for youth, but in the highest degree dangerous to it, 
as the moderns demonstrate.”177  Here Nietzsche very well may be drawing on the authority 
of Aristotle: 
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All people are good at making distinctions about the things they are 
acquainted with, and each is a good judge of those things.  Therefore, good 
judgment goes along with the way each one is educated, and the one who has 
been educated about everything has it in an unqualified way.  For this reason, 
it is not appropriate for a young person to a be a student of politics, since the 
young are inexperienced in the actions of life, while these are the things about 
which politics speaks and from which it reasons.178 
 
The Belief that He is an Epigone 
Section seven of the second Untimely Meditation marks the end of Nietzche’s 
examination of the various cultural consequences of the academic historians’ pursuit of a 
new, purportedly objective approach to history.  Up to this point, Nietzsche had dealt 
primarily with that species of historicism that makes people aware of the enormous diversity 
of political institutions and convictions across the vast expanse of human history.  This 
variant of historicism stressed the ineluctable ‘situatedness’ of human beings within history, 
characterizing the moral and political thought of any given historical period as reactionary, 
meaning historically contingent upon the situational characteristics of the time.  In the next 
two sections of the text, however, Nietzsche turns to the task of describing the cultural 
consequences of a different, if related species of historicism—namely, Hegelianism.   
The overexposure of the young to the low and vulgar facts of history results indeed in 
“a kind of inborn grey-hairedness, and those who bear its mark from childhood must 
instinctively believe in the old age of mankind.”179  Nietzsche worries that too much 
knowledge about the vast and varied accomplishments of peoples of the past discourage 
German youths from believing that they have it within their souls to produce monuments, 
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paintings, music, novels, poetry, and philosophy of comparable worth.  That this is his 
concern should come as a shock to no one with experience of contemporary university 
students.  Students barely have the time to think for themselves, to create great works of their 
own because they are so busy studying the works of others across cultures and time.  What 
work they do manage to produce becomes a vulgar imitation, a mish-mash of everything he 
has been exposed to yet totally devoid of any distinguishing characteristics that would make 
it unique.  An entire culture that comes to believe that there is nothing left to do in the world, 
that the greatest feats of human possibility have already come to pass, has nothing to do but 
pass away.  Perhaps it would be better for man to be extinguished altogether in the face of 
such a fate.   
 Nietzsche thinks that this kind of self-resignation—indeed, self-abnegation—is the 
logical conclusion of the historicist philosophy of G. W. F. Hegel.  Such an interpretation 
must surely strike the reader as strange, given what is usually taken to be the inherently 
optimistic nature of Hegelianism.  After all, Hegel argued that progress was built-in to 
history.  History is an eternal process of the dialectic, with each historical moment being a 
concatenation of contradictions.  Tension exists between the thesis and the antithesis, but out 
of the conflict a synthesis is born—one that preserves and builds upon the best of the old 
historical moment.  The ‘best’ that history aims to preserve is freedom, self-actualization, the 
expansion of human consciousness.  In the political realm, for example, modern democratic 
societies represent clear advancements in freedom over the kinds of societies that existed 
under medieval feudalism.  Such an example of political evolution represents for Hegel a 
clear victory for the logical and rational processes that are inevitably playing themselves out 
in history. 
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 For Nietzsche, however, Hegel’s philosophy constitutes little more than an 
unexamined teleology with lamentably progressive or Whiggish consequences.  He fiercely 
objects to Hegel’s “pretentious gloss” on human history as rational or absolute because he 
thought that its emphasis on the collective left little room or purpose for individual free will, 
self-expression, and self-creation.180   Far from explaining how freedom comes to be realized 
in the world, Hegel’s philosophy deemphasizes the responsibility the individual has for 
creating situations of freedom or un-freedom. 
 Nietzsche similarly decries Hegel’s attempt to systematize philosophy and history, 
combining the two in a single unified narrative.  To Nietzsche, Hegel represents the attempt 
to render impossible the flourishing of distinctly different cultures whose primary legislators 
of value may have a way of life in mind quite different than that imagined by a German 
idealist philosopher.  Nietzsche speculates in Thus Spoke Zarathustra that the kind of man 
Hegel imagines will not have the decency to rid himself of the world; rather, this pitiable 
man will have no lofty goals whatsoever and will be concerned only with self-preservation.  
The last man is to be the fate of mankind, and Nietzsche openly laments this.  He will be 
totally without the capacity to create new stories and found new cultures, and the result will 
be the debasement of mankind. 
The moral lesson Nietzsche stresses here is the same as in his interpretation of chapter 
fifteen of Thus Spoke Zarathustra, “A Thousand and One Goals.”  The chapter’s title, 
didactic in and of itself, is an allusion to A Thousand and One Nights (better known in the 
West as simply Arabian Nights), a compilation of Arabic tales assembled between the twelfth 
and fourteenth centuries.  In one of the collection’s more famous stories, the vengeful King 
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Shahryar, having been betrayed by his adulterous wife, promises never to trust another 
woman again, deciding instead to have his way with a different virgin every night, only to 
have her executed the next day.  The executions continue until three years later when the 
daughter of the king’s vizier, Shahrazad, offers herself to Shahryar in hopes that she can 
pacify his bloodlust with her story-telling abilities.  Shahrazad spends her first night with 
Shahryar relating one of her stories, holding the king’s attention through the night until the 
early morning when he finally admits that he must be off to his work.  Curious about the 
marvelous story’s conclusion, Shahryar spares the young girl’s life until the next night when 
she can finish the story, and he can be done with her.  The next night brings more of the 
same: another marvelous tale unconcluded.  This continues for a thousand and one nights 
until Shahryar makes Shahrazad his queen.    
Nietzsche’s allusion is chosen aptly in two respects.  First, Nietzsche sees the human 
condition as that of Shahrazad, compelled to constantly construct a new, marvelous, yet 
utterly fictional story for the sake of her own mortality.  A thousand peoples have existed 
with moralities based on stories holding the attention of an entire culture, whether those tales 
be of sirens and Trojan horses, serpents and forbidden fruit, or betrayers and a crucified man-
God.  Story telling preserves life.  Only now does the coming of the last-men, marching 
behind the liberal democratic flag of tolerance and pluralism, endanger the ability of peoples 
to sustain themselves with their stories (i.e., their religions). Second, the Arabic tales 
demonstrated that stories without overtly religious overtones could teach valuable moral 
lessons.  This is an important truth for Nietzsche: given Zarathustra’s exclamation that “God 
is dead!” (12) the prophet will have to resort to other means if he wishes to unite mankind in 
a common story. 
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 There is one very important difference, however, between Shahrazad’s plight and the 
plight of humanity:  it matters not whether Shahrazad believes the stories she tells to be true.  
According to Nietzsche, peoples must believe their stories to be true, lest they fall into 
nihilism and find themselves unable to tell a new story.  Should mankind continue on its 
present course it will find itself tongue-tied and ensure its own execution. 
 The problem that Nietzsche foresees is a world so encumbered by historical 
knowledge that there can be no new stories.  In such a world there can be no pretenses to the 
importance of a particular people or nation, for their histories are entirely knowable and 
therefore unremarkable.  Thus Nietzsche predicts that the awareness of one’s historically 
contingent origins will inevitably result in a spirit of cynicism that undercuts the kind of 
aesthetic politics he wishes to inculcate. 
 
The Transition from Irony to Cynicism 
 The final danger that Nietzsche identifies as a consequence of the scientific approach 
to historical studies concerns the way that a culture, and indeed the individuals that inhabit it, 
understand both themselves and their communities.  Nietzsche is adamant over the course of 
the second Untimely Meditation that for people to be considered truly mature, they must exist 
within the confines of an enveloping horizon.  That horizon, beyond which they cannot see, 
provides the necessarily stability for their values—the  reasons on which they act morally and 
immorally, justly and unjustly.  They provide people with their definitions of good and evil 
so that they might act accordingly and judge the actions of others. 
 Nietzsche worries, however, that the awareness that one’s culture is simply one 
amongst many—that ultimately there is no reason why its social mores and rules should be 
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treated as more sacred than any other—will ultimately mean the inculcation of an ironic 
mood in cultures and in individual psyches.  This is to say that when one acts morally, it will 
be solely as a result of an individual’s free choice and will; the person will be cognizant of 
the fact that there is no ultimate foundation for their moral choices, no metaphysics to justify 
certain behaviors.  While Nietzsche’s contemporaries seem to give no notice to this problem, 
he worries about it, expressing concern not so much with ironic behavior itself as with the 
eventual consequences of its continual practice.  He begins the eighth section of his 
meditation with the following: 
It may seem strange, though it ought not to seem self-contradictory, when I 
ascribe a kind of ironic self-awareness to an age accustomed to break into 
such a loud and innocent rejoicing at its historical culture, and say that it is 
infused with a presentiment that there is really nothing to rejoice about and a 
fear that all the merriment of historical knowledge will soon be over and done 
with.181 
 
Here Nietzsche draws out what must be the necessary progression of the rise, decline, and 
fall of historical culture.  In the beginning, historical culture prides itself on its ability to 
plumb the wisdom of past ages, to make available to all the information about cultures past 
and foreign.  Eventually, however, historical culture exhausts its own resources.  The novelty 
of recovering more and more information from the past is lost when a person realizes that the 
very culture of which he is a part is a small and insignificant part of the historical maelstrom.  
Hundreds of years from now his ancestors will have reduced his own lifetime, his generation, 
and his culture to a matter of the historical record.  From this ironic self-awareness stems a 
feeling of cynicism, an understanding that ultimately one’s actions mean very little, as do the 
ways of life that characterize one’s culture. 
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What is particularly prescient in Nietzsche’s observation here is the fact that the late 
twentieth century has seen certain thinkers embrace precisely this kind of ironic stance.  
What Nietzsche describes as a “troubled presentiment that he is in error” is in fact the first 
part of Richard Rorty’s three-part definition of the liberal ironist.182  Whereas Rorty describes 
this sentiment as the first part of a personality sufficient to found a liberal utopia, Nietzsche 
sees it has a harbinger of society’s final dissolution.  The very ironic sentiment that Rorty 
wishes to inculcate in the most sophisticated and mature of citizens Nietzsche wants to 
discourage, characterizing such an ironic posture as the height of immaturity.  Rorty believes 
that human beings have the capacity to commit themselves to values and to projects knowing 
full well that that the universe provides no ultimate foundations for them, that they rest 
merely on individual will and personal preference.  Although Nietzsche himself suspects that 
nothing more than individual will underlies human commitments, loyalties, and preferences, 
he does not expect the masses of humanity to live without some kind of over-arching story 
that gives meaning and purpose to their lives.  For Nietzsche, both the German historians of 
his era and the postmodern “pragmatists” of our era ask too much of human beings, and the 
results of that overreaching is disastrous for mankind. 
In order to save mankind from too much historical awareness, Nietzsche proposes 
that history be written in a way that takes into account specific human psychological needs.  
No longer may historical study remain the seemingly innocuous attempt to uncover historical 
facts.  Rather, a select few, uniquely qualified individuals must undertake the task of writing 
history with a view toward a healthy, stable culture.  Having reviewed the abuses to which 
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history is put, we now turn to that task, considering what Nietzsche regards as history’s 
proper uses. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 8 
 
THE MONUMENTAL, ANTIQUARIAN, AND CRITICAL MODES OF HISTORY 
 
 
History… is a tool we use each generation or each year to help get along in 
the world, discarding the old tool for a new one whenever necessary. 
         Paul K. Conkin 
 
 
Although Nietzsche spends most of the second Untimely Meditation inveighing 
against the various dangers associated with an age oversaturated with history, his 
contribution to historiography is by no means entirely critical.  As the essay’s title makes 
plain, it includes a discussion not only of the abuses to which historical knowledge is put, but 
also of its proper uses—how history can be made to serve the interests of the living.  For 
Nietzsche, the question is not whether we should remember; if we did not, we could scarcely 
distinguish ourselves from the beasts of the field.  Rather, the question is how we should 
remember—how history should be written in order to best utilize the individual memories of 
human beings and the shared memories of communities and cultures. 
 In sections four through ten of On the Uses and Disadvantages of History for Life, 
Nietzsche extols the virtue of forgetfulness by describing the human costs—social, cultural, 
and psychological—of the modern belief in historical study and the assumption that history is 
progress.  In sections two and three, however, Nietzsche praises the value of remembering by 
identifying the three ways life is actually in need of the services of history.  History, 
Nietzsche argues, “pertains to the living…as a being who acts and strives, as a being who 
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preserves and reserves, [and] as a being who suffers and seeks deliverance.”183  From these 
different dispositions in the soul of man arise the three pure species of history—the 
monumental, the antiquarian, and the critical. The genuine historian, Nietzsche argues, must 
have recourse to each of these modes of history because each ministers to specific human 
needs and longings.184  Each method of historical writing, however, is subject to its own 
characteristic excesses and abuses, thus making the historian’s task all the more delicate and 
unruly.   
On the surface, Nietzsche’s account of the proper uses of history is compelling.  But 
close scrutiny reveals that his historiography casually subordinates science to culture, 
historical fact to political convenience. Because he thinks that the purpose of history is to 
secure the psychological health of a nation by imbuing its people with a sense of meaning 
and destiny, justifying the existence of its institutions, and sanctifying a common morality, 
Nietzsche’s ethics of history constitutes as much an exercise in mythmaking and aesthetic 
politics as a contribution to historiography. 
 
 
Monumental History 
 
 The monumental approach to history exists to demonstrate human potential, to 
provide people images of past greatness.  The writers of this sort of history preoccupy 
themselves with humanity’s highest exemplars—our greatest moral heroes, political 
statesman, military leaders, religious redeemers, and intellectual innovators.  Nietzsche 
believes that by presenting human beings as historical models worthy of emulation, these 
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histories will provide inspiring examples of courage, dignity, wisdom, and self-sacrifice, thus 
ensuring the cultivation of a new generation of remarkable human accomplishment. 
Monumental history is informed by the methodological assumption that acclaimed 
contributions in art, literature, philosophy, politics, and science share in common the 
indelible mark of greatness.  Recognizing this greatness, the monumental historian dutifully 
records it, following the commandment which rules over him: “that which in the past was 
able to expand the concept ‘man’ and make it more beautiful must exist everlastingly, so as 
to be able to accomplish this everlastingly.”185  Because greatness is eternal, the achievement 
of human excellence through acts of greatness should similarly be eternal. 
 Nietzsche does not take it for granted that every age and every culture has lent itself 
equally to the pursuit of excellence.  In fact, his recognition of the human need for 
monumental history stems in part from his deep dissatisfaction with German culture in the 
latter half of the nineteenth century.  He takes as his examples of the highest human 
exemplars Goethe, Schiller, and the men of the Italian Renaissance.  Lamentably, according 
to his account, Germany is sorely lacking in the kinds of people that could engender another 
great rebirth of learning in the West.  In an historical age in which new cultural heroes are 
absent, people must be reminded of the fact that the past is replete with men of great deeds.  
Human greatness, Nietzsche argues, has thus far managed to perpetuate itself across time, but 
it waxes and wanes.  He notes: 
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…that the great moments in the struggle of the human individual constitute a chain, 
that this chain unites mankind across the millennia like a range of human mountain 
peaks, that the summit of such a long-ago moment shall be for me still living, bright 
and great – that this is the fundamental idea of the faith in humanity which finds 
expression in the demand for a monumental history.186 
 
 Although the monumental historian is charged with the preservation and promotion of 
human excellence, he can also serve to impede and destroy it.  Monumental history, like 
antiquarian and critical history, has the potential to fall prey to a particular set of problems 
when historians practice it to excess or people interpret it in ways that are not conducive to 
the cultivation of great human beings.  For example, confronted with the knowledge of the 
extraordinary achievements of philosophers like Plato and Aristotle, artists like Michelangelo 
and Raphael, and scientists like Galileo and Newton, one might reasonably come to believe 
that striving for greatness is ultimately a futile effort.  Why bother with philosophy, painting, 
or stargazing when one’s contributions to each field of human endeavor will inevitably pale 
in comparison to the gifts bestowed upon us by the giants?  If the differences between great 
men of the past and those of the present are overemphasized, the human spirit for innovation 
and exploration can be crushed.  Human beings ought to strive to emulate historical models, 
but only while fully cognizant of the fact that such models exist not to be worshipped as 
religious idols but surpassed as cultural competition. 
Similarly, Nietzsche recognizes that human beings can get so caught up in the spirit 
of adventure and heroism that they are liable to conduct deeds not of courage and nobility but 
of foolhardiness and fanaticism.  Presented with accounts of military valor that stress the 
character of steadfast leadership but provide little in the way of political context, human 
beings are liable to exploit any occasion for war in the effort to acquire honor and fame.  
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Still, despite what Nietzsche understands as the human predilection toward recklessness in 
this regard, he maintains that the potential for harm presented by monumental history is 
relatively small; thus it remains one of the most important forms of history in Nietzsche’s 
typology.187 
 
 
Antiquarian History 
 
 Whereas monumental history is meant to spur only the highest human individuals to 
action, antiquarian history serves the needs of humanity at large through the cultivation of 
psychically healthy individuals and nations.  Nietzsche offers as a metric for an individual’s 
psychic health the sense of “love and loyalty” he feels for his nation, the degree to which he 
can “look back to whence he has come, to where he came into being” and still retain a sense 
of piety and “give thanks.”188  That is, individuals and peoples are healthy insofar as they are 
able to preserve a sense of rootedness and historical continuity.  Antiquarian history, what 
might well be titled ancestral history, teaches people to venerate the past; it makes them 
content with their homelands and customs by infusing them with the solemn significance that 
comes with being part of a grand historical narrative.  It assures people of their special place 
by explaining the nature of the relationship between kin and countrymen, thus setting them 
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apart from the rest of humanity.  Antiquarian history emphasizes above all the familial and 
the sacred in culture in order to obviate the human experience of despair and anomie that 
sometimes accompanies lonely existential examination of one’s place in a neighborhood, a 
city, a state, a country, and indeed, the universe.  Only by means of a story about how one is 
intimately related to the past can a person find meaning and purpose.  In this way the 
antiquarian mode of history seeks nothing less than to provide a local and time-bound 
justification for human existence. 
 Antiquarian history outlives its usefulness when it degenerates into antiquarianism—
the study of the past for the past’s sake, regardless of its usefulness for human life.  The 
antiquarian historian maintains a love-hate relationship with the very concept of tradition.  
On the one hand, it is through the practice of traditional rituals, the maintenance of 
predictable social mores, and membership in longstanding political institutions that human 
beings are able to give meaning and purpose to their lives.  Yet as Nietzsche readily admits, 
no way of life can be justified solely in terms of endurance; the passage of time does not 
confer authoritative status upon any culture.  Nor, for that matter, does any particular way of 
life deserve to endure.  Too often, Nietzsche argues, human beings become so comfortably 
inured in nostalgia and sentimentality that they forget that the purpose of historical 
knowledge is to push them forward, not pull them backward.  In extreme cases, the 
antiquarian sense “paralyzes the man of action who, as one who acts, will and must offend 
some piety or other.”189  Due to any number of unforeseeable cultural conflicts, the time will 
inevitably come in which changes must be made to a society if any part of it is to survive.  
The antiquarian historian is without recourse in such a situation, for while he knows how to 
                                                
189 Nietzsche, On the Uses and Disadvantages of History for Life, 3.4, 75. 
 
 88 
preserve life, he is without the knowledge and expertise to help create it.  Given this fact, 
Nietzsche contends that a final mode of history must be practiced as a necessary antidote to 
the excesses and shortcomings of antiquarian history. 
 
 
Critical History 
 
 Despite the fact that the critical species of history most closely resembles the modern 
academic, scientific conception of history, it is arguably the most enigmatic of Nietzsche’s 
three modes.  It is distinguished most clearly by its negative orientation.  While both 
monumental and antiquarian historians seek to preserve, promote, and indeed celebrate the 
subject matter of their histories, critical historians take as their subject matter those elements 
of the past they deem worthy of condemnation.  Nietzsche provides an account for the 
theoretical foundations for critical history when he remarks that 
every past…is worthy to be condemned…human violence and weakness have always 
played a mighty role in them.  It is not justice which here sits in judgment; it is even 
less mercy which pronounces the verdict: it is life alone, that dark, driving power that 
insatiably thirsts for itself.  Its sentence is always unmerciful, always unjust, because 
it has never proceeded out of a pure well of knowledge; but in most cases the 
sentence would be the same even if it were pronounced by justice itself. ‘For all that 
exists is worthy of perishing.  So it would be better if nothing existed.’190 
 
 Like the historians of monumental and antiquarian history, the critical historian is 
obliged to make normative judgments about the content of his history.  Unlike the first two 
historians, however, the critical historian is charged with the responsibility of evaluating the 
total health of a people, a nation, and a culture in order to determine whether history as it is 
currently taught and practiced is ultimately beneficial or injurious.  He must decide what 
elements of a particular culture’s history are emphasized or underemphasized, which 
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elements are brought into the light and which ones must remain hidden.  In short, he 
determines nothing less than a people’s individual and collective self-understanding—how 
they view themselves and each other as members of a community in a world of vastly 
differing cultural communities. 
 The intellectual and artistic demands that Nietzsche makes of his critical historians 
betray his true Platonic intentions in the second Untimely Meditation: to make history the 
sole purview of the philosopher.  In a compilation of rough notes amounting to a preliminary 
study of the nature of philosophy and the philosopher’s relation to the people, Nietzsche 
likens the philosopher to a physician whose prowess admits the preparation, preservation, 
moderation, and destruction of culture. 191  A reoccurring personage throughout his works, 
the philosopher as cultural physician can pursue “the problem of the total health of a people, 
time, race or of humanity,” only by first “applying the knife vivisectionally to the chest of the 
virtues of [his] time.”192  However, the philosopher, like the medical doctor, possesses the 
same potential for harm that he does for good.  According to Nietzsche, the philosopher 
proves the most useful when he clarifies the muddled ideas of a culture or rids a people of its 
unnecessary superstitions.193  Conversely, he proves the most harmful when he “dissolves the 
customary moralities” of a culture or deprives a people of its necessary illusions.194  If he has 
any concern for culture, then, the philosopher must determine the value of ideas not by the 
standard of truthfulness but on the basis of their consequences for life; he must curtail the 
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unlimited drive to knowledge within himself and within his culture for the sake of both 
health and unity.   
 For Nietzsche, then, true history is as much an art as a science; its proper practice 
requires nothing less than the philosophical consideration of the psychological needs of a 
community and the constant evaluation of the extent of a community’s cultural progress, 
stagnation, and decline.  Although Nietzsche is to be lauded for recognizing that the writing 
of history—no matter whether it be done by his philosopher historians or by the nineteenth 
century German historians he criticizes—inevitably involves considerable judgment, his 
aesthetic approach to history presents a number of problems that should give us pause for 
consideration. 
 The problem that lurks in the background of Nietzsche’s discussion of the three 
species of history concerns the rather cavalier attitude he takes toward historical truth.  
Except on rare occasions, and purely for instrumental and rhetorical effect, Nietzsche takes it 
for granted that objective, true historical knowledge is possible.  Yet during his discussion of 
the proper manner in which history should be written, he evidences little concern over the 
increasing availability of large quantities of historical documents and artifacts.  Scientifically 
minded historians rely upon historical excavation work to help them ascertain historical facts.  
To be sure, such historians unavoidably add an interpretative dimension to the facts they 
uncover, but their narratives must ultimately be shaped—indeed, determined—by what the 
available evidence will support.  Because Nietzsche’s historiography is ultimately an 
aesthetic one predicated on the intellectual judgment of a philosopher, it admits of no rigid 
methodological principles that cannot be broken for the sake of social utility.  In fact, he 
explicitly relieves his genuine historians of the responsibility to render the past justly, i.e., 
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objectively.  Rather, Nietzsche defends history as one of the rhetorical tools that makes 
imagined national communities possible.  Whatever obligations Nietzsche places upon 
historians are to present and future communities, not to the past.  Because of the binary 
opposition he presents between truth and life, science and history, the view of history put 
forth in the second Untimely Meditation is ultimately one of mythmaking and poetry, the 
dangers of which deserve enumeration. 
 Although Nietzsche deems the subject of monumental history to be the enduring truth 
about human excellence, he admits that practitioners of this mode of history run the risk of 
having their work become “free poetic invention.”195  While he correctly labels this as a 
problem, he provides no assurance to the reader that he has given any thought to how many 
noble lies of omission or commission are necessary before a story suddenly becomes 
inadmissible as history.  Clearly, Nietzsche is not so much concerned that lies are being told 
as he is with the effects of such lies. 
 The monumental conception of the past purportedly exists to remind mankind of its 
greatest exemplars.  However, by fabricating some of the details surrounding important 
historical figures and failing to disclose others, the examples posed by monumental figures 
only remain that much further away from ordinary people.  Nietzsche does not want the 
monumental conception of history dedicated to mythic heroes, but he comes close to 
ensuring exactly that by not admitting the necessity of exposing the foibles of literary, 
artistic, philosophic, and scientific celebrities.  For example, how much less would 
Americans know about Abraham Lincoln were we subject to the Nietzschean view of 
history?  Presumably we would still know that he was president of the United States from 
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1861-1865 and presided over a disastrous Civil War.  We might know that he issued the 
Emancipation Proclamation on January 1, 1863, abolishing slavery in the states that rebelled 
against the Union.  No doubt we would still read stories emphasizing his heroism, wisdom, 
courage, pride, loyalty, and selflessness.  But would we know anything of the deep 
melancholy that characterized his demeanor?  Would the increased speculation that Lincoln 
suffered from something like what we now call clinical depression make him any less an 
admirable statesman—a model worthy of emulation?  Nietzsche is not forthcoming with 
answers to these questions. 
 Answers to such questions prove elusive in part because Nietzsche provides so scant 
an account of the educational process that his philosopher historians must undergo before 
they become qualified to write monumental history (or, indeed, any other kind of history).  
He remarks that only men of action, experience, and reflection are suited to the writing of 
history, but this serves only to further complicate the problem.  Nietzsche is arguing quite 
explicitly that the history of great human beings can only be written by other great human 
beings.  But would any society wish that history become the purview of such a 
philosophically and experientially rarified elite?  How much good work would be lost if 
histories were written only by people who had direct experience of their historical subject 
before undertaking an historical research project of any kind?  To take a concrete example, 
would Nietzsche pay no respect to John Keegan’s The Face of Battle simply because its 
author had admittedly never experienced war on the ground?   Relying only on Nietzsche’s 
text to provide a response, the answer must be yes. 
Similar problems plague Nietzsche’s discussion of the antiquarian conception of 
history.  Presumably he would have no problem with an entire cultural history of a people 
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being invented out of whole cloth were the philosopher historian to determine that such a 
history ultimately served to benefit culture.  Here once again Nietzsche reveals his affinities 
with Plato by explicitly justifying the admission of noble lies as the necessary foundation for 
stable societies.  Indeed, he shares with Plato the belief that historical truth and human reason 
alone are insufficient to keep the state cohesive.  But if one accepts this argument, the ends 
identified by the philosopher historian will always justify the means.  In such a society where 
the truth of history is determined by a privileged few, its people, as with the citizens of 
Oceania, should not expect to know for certain whether they are at war with Eastasia or 
Eurasia. 
 As for the critical historian, he faces perhaps the most difficult questions of all.  On 
what basis does one judge the overall health and stability of a society?  How does one go 
about the business of determining whether history as it is currently taught and practiced is 
ultimately proving beneficial or injurious for the society?  How can he alone legislate 
changes in the curriculum and, by extension, change a people’s self-understanding?  
Nietzsche provides no help in this regard.  He tells us nothing specific about what histories 
are worthy of uncovering—nothing of what is worthy of knowing, preserving, or denying—
except to proclaim that the genuine historian will somehow know all of these things.  As 
Nietzsche’s friend Erwin Rohde criticized the essay in a letter, Nietzsche unfortunately 
“deduces all too little,” leaving up to his reader more “than is fair or desirable.”196 
 The second Untimely Meditation ends with a call for the recovery of Greek wisdom in 
the hopes that grand new art and religion would flourish in a renewed German culture made 
possible through this new conception of historical writing.  However, the nostalgia displayed 
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in the closing does less to help the reader understand the nature of Nietzsche’s philosophical 
and historical task than to remind him that at this time he was still very much under the spell 
of the composer Richard Wagner.  With Wagner he was determined to reshape German 
culture on the model of Greek tragedy, to introduce new forms of opera and drama that 
would come as close as humanly possible to the art responsible for the original birth of 
wisdom in classical Greece.  But with the burgeoning of science in the academy across all 
disciplines and the spread of bourgeois culture in Germany, Nietzsche’s wishes were never 
fulfilled.   
 In the end, Nietzsche’s attempts to reinvigorate nineteenth century German culture 
through the institution of a radical historical methodology was bound to fail.  It failed 
because historical truth and life, or vitality as Nietzsche sometimes refers to it, need not be 
viewed as being in opposition.  All of the goals that Nietzsche prescribes for history—to 
provide inspiration and motivation, preserve tradition and meaning, and make normative 
judgments about the value of particular historical narratives—are all largely achieved by 
historians who practice the scientific mode of history he so vehemently opposed.  Nietzsche 
is right to ask academic historians to consider the value of their historical contributions, to 
work less as thinking, writing, and publishing machines and more as genuine contributors to 
national culture.  But his demand that historical work be limited to a select few only serves to 
limit rather than expand the possibilities of good cultural history.  History practiced 
democratically may allow a much wider range of useful and not so useful contributions, but it 
is from this variety that we distinguish the great historians from the mediocre ones, 
memorable and meaningful history from the accountant’s record of the past. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 9 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 
Historical sense and poetic sense should not, in the end, be contradictory, for 
if poetry is the little myth we make, history is the big myth we live, and in our 
living, constantly remake.  
Robert Penn Warren 
 
 
 Although it has been my purpose to show that Nietzsche’s historiography is far more 
complicated and far less innocuous than most interpreters have been willing to admit, I have 
also tried to show that his criticisms of nineteenth century German culture can still speak to 
us in ways that might help us improve our own democratic culture. 
 Every historian should have as his or her goal a deep and abiding dedication to 
uncovering and faithfully communicating historical fact.  But the facts that one chooses to 
report, the reasons that undergird one’s program of historical research can vary widely, and 
no apologies need be made for historical accuracy that happens to serve a political agenda.  
With this realization in mind, I think that the monumental, antiquarian, and critical 
approaches to history could be adapted in ways that serve the ends of democratic culture. 
 To be sure, even societies such as ours that promote pluralism, egalitarianism, and 
respect for inherent human dignity have their heroes to be lionized and traditions to be held 
sacred.  In the American political tradition, such figures as Thomas Paine, Benjamin 
Franklin, James Madison, Ralph Waldo Emerson, Elizabeth Cady Stanton, Mark Twain, W. 
E. B. Du Bois, Jane Addams, and Malcolm X immediately come to mind, as do such values 
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as individualism, natural rights, equality before the law, upward mobility, religious tolerance, 
free and fair elections, and economic prosperity.  One could easily imagine a corresponding 
genre of critical history that weighed the contributions of notable American citizens by their 
ability to help maximize the liberties and utilities of individuals and extend the sphere of 
human welfare and respect to the historically disadvantaged.  Despite Nietzsche’s 
protestations, the positive effects of such history in educating American citizens could only 
be increased by the historian’s dedication to the unvarnished truths surrounding both progress 
and oppression. 
 If the political problems that abound in the United States can be ascribed to a failure 
of democratic political practice, it is due in large part to the failure to extend democratic 
culture to the outer regions of American society.  Only a society intellectually prepared and 
genuinely eager to discuss the legitimate functions of government has the wherewithal to 
determine the general good in an objective fashion and finally realize the promise of 
democracy.  And only a society genuinely schooled in the history of democracy—made fully 
aware of its heroes, its traditions, its pitfalls—can hope to achieve this goal.  His deep 
antipathy toward democracy notwithstanding, Nietzsche’s views on history are very helpful 
in this regard, and we should make no apologies for enlisting him in our own democratic 
project of cultural renewal. 
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